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ABSTRACT

Copyright was initially conceptualized as a means to free creative parties
from dependency on public andprivatepatrons such as monarchs, churches, and
well-to-do private citizens. By achieving independence for creative parties, the
theory ran, copyright led to greaterproduction of a more diverse set of creative
works.
But this lingering conception of copyright is both inaccurateand harmful. It
is inaccurate because, in today's world, creative parties are increasingly
dependent upon "Technological Patronage"from the likes of Google, Amazon,
Apple, and others. Thus, ratherthan being alternatives or adversaries,copyright
and TechnologicalPatronageare increasingly interdependentin facilitatingboth
creative and innovative activity. It is harmful because, by overemphasizing
copyright's role in spurring creative activity, the traditional view of copyright
tends to polarize debates about how best to addresskey copyrightquestions.
Instead, copyright is more accurately understood as an interdependentpart
of a broader creative system that facilitates both creative and innovative
activities. This Article reviews several examples of this interdependence. It also
highlights this interdependence by examining how technology companies are
solving some of copyright law's most pressing issues.
Overall, this interdependent view of copyrightprovides a better framework
for assessing the role of copyright, its technological complements, andproposed
solutions to issues that relate to both creative and innovative activities. This
Article also suggests that copyright and patent laws would be well served by
doctrinal adjustments that better reflect these interdependencies. Indeed, the
Constitutionalprovision authorizing intellectualproperty laws arguably supports
such efforts.
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INTRODUCTION
Debates about the effects of technology on creative output are
longstanding. 1 On the one hand, some proponents of nearly unfettered

1. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 111 (2001) (reviewing the various
challenges to copyright law presented by new technology); see generally, e.g., Ben
Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA.
L. REv. 1831 (2009) (examining the relationship between technology and copyright law and
arguing that rapid technological change creates legal delay and uncertainty, which in turn
leads to anticopyright sentiments, greater reliance on self-help by content providers and
users, and legislative involvement in copyright law); Keiyana Fordham, Can Newspapers Be
Saved? How Copyright Law Can Save Newspapers from the Challenges of New Media, 20
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 939 (2010) (arguing that digital technologies
have partially undermined the newspaper industry and proposing copyright reforms that can
help address this issue); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Lawfor the InjormationAge, 75
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technological advancement argue that technological change is largely a boon to
creative output and that copyright frequently operates to impede both creative
output and technological innovation. 2 Copyright, therefore, should be relaxed
in significant respects. 3 Indeed, some go so far as to argue that copyright in
today's technological world can often be dispensed with; the purported
incentive spark of copyright is unnecessary to facilitate creative activity in
many contexts. 4 Technological advancements and other non-copyright-related
factors are often sufficient to spur enormous amounts of creative activity. 5
In contrast, others argue that copyright remains a vital institution, and that
unconstrained technological advancements threaten creative output by
6
facilitating copyright infringement and generally devaluing creative works.

OR. L. REV. 19 (1996) (arguing that attempts to maintain old copyright rules in the face of
technological changes is the wrong approach).
2. See generally, e.g., Michael Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story,
2012 Wis. L. REV. 891 (presenting evidence suggesting that aggressive copyright
enforcement on the part of record labels following the Napster decision had the effect of
chilling vast amounts of innovative activity); Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S.
CAL. L. REv. 797 (2010) (arguing that copyright law, as currently implemented, is illequipped to deal with various technological challenges to it, and proposing as a partial
solution to such problems a fair use defense to copyright infringement that more fully takes
into account technological considerations); Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the
Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125 (2011) (arguing that technology,
rather than being a threat to the content industries, is typically a boon to them, and offering
several suggestions as to how the content industries can adjust their business models in order
to succeed in the digital age).
3. See generally, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Increasing Innovation Through Copyright
Common Sense and Better Government Policy, 62 EMORY L.J. 983 (2013) (setting forth a
number of proposed reforms to copyright law that may help foster innovation); F. Gregory
Lastowka, Free Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
293 (2001) (arguing that copyright law should be relaxed in certain respects in order to more
effectively take into account the growing trend of free content distribution); Lee, supra note
2.
4. See, e.g., Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly UtilitarianCopyright, 91 IOWA L. REV.
609, 609 (2006) (arguing that copyright may not be necessary as an incentive spark for the
fine arts); Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright,
4 FIRST MONDAY 8 (1999), available at http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/
view/684/594 (arguing that the free software movement shows that the incentives of
copyright are largely irrelevant to creative output in the software world).
5. Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REv.
1745, 1771-81 (2012) (discussing important non-pecuniary interests that spur innovative and
creative activities); David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 463, 482-83 (arguing that creative activity often flows from
"creative play" rather than being caused by copyright per se); Moglen, supra note 4.
6. Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 585, 586 (2011) (arguing for a first right of online publication for copyright
holders that is not subject to a fair use defense); John M. Newman, Copyright Freeconomics,
66 VAND. L. REv. 1409, 1412 (2013) (arguing that a growing trend of zero-price content
brought about through technological changes undermines the economic model underpinning
copyright law and suggesting changes to copyright law in order to preserve its relevance);
Scott Timberg, It's Not Just David Byrne and Radiohead: Spotify, Pandora and How
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Therefore, some in this camp argue for bolstering copyright protections in order
to ward off the threat to creative output that technological advancements
purportedly present. 7 Laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA") and court holdings
effectively banning certain digital technologies
8
exemplify such efforts.
This Article argues that a significant cause of the disconnect between these
two sides lies in how copyright has traditionally been conceptualized, and that
re-conceptualizing it can help solve the impasse. For instance, historically, one
of the primary purposes in establishing copyright was to provide creative
persons with an independent means by which to create. 9 That is, so long as
authors and artists were beholden to monarchs, churches, or other private and
public patrons for their livelihoods -which had often been the case
traditionally -creative output would be constrained for fear of upsetting the

Streaming Music Kills Jazz and Classical, SALON (July 20, 2014, 2:00 PM MDT),
http://www.salon.com/2014/07/20/its not just david byrne and radiohead spotify pandor
a and how streaming music kills jazz and classical/; Tim Waterstone, Amazon Is
Discounting Us to Death, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2012, 1:00 PM EDT),
http: //www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/06/amazon-destroy-britain-bookindustry. See generally, ASTRA TAYLOR, THE PEOPLE'S PLATFORM: TAKING BACK POWER
AND CULTURE IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2014).
7. See ROBERT LEVIN, FREE RIDE: How DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE
CULTURE BUSINESS, AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK (2012); Fordham,

supra note 1; Newman, supra note 6; Strengthen Copyright in Digital Environment Gambian Minister, HUMAN IPO (Jan. 8, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.humanipo.com/
news /38598/strengthen-copyright-in-digital -environment-gambian-minister (Gambian trade
minister arguing that copyright must be bolstered in the face of digital technologies).
8. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2001)
(confirming that the distributor of a peer-to-peer file sharing program could be liable as a
contributory and vicarious infringer); U1MG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp.
2d 349, 350-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that defendant's online posting of MP3 files for
access by individuals who could prove that they owned a CD copy was not a protected fair
use under copyright law).
9. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 65 (1965)
(statement of Abraham Kaminstein, former Register of Copyrights) (indicating that "[t]he
basic purpose of copyright protection is the public interest, to make sure that the wellsprings
of creation do not dry up through lack of incentive, and to provide an alternative to the evils
of an authorship dependent upon private or public patronage."); Sir Thomas Babington
Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in FOUNDATIONS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 310 (Robert Merges & Jane Ginsburg eds., 2004) (arguing that,
though copyright as a monopoly comes with some drawbacks, it is much preferable to the
preceding systems of patronage); Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 387, 429-38 (2003) (describing copyright as a mechanism for eventually displacing
the evils associated with public patronage from the crown in England). See generally Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996)
(arguing that copyright is not merely a necessary evil, but is a beneficent "state measure that
uses market institutions to enhance the democratic character of civil society" and, by
encouraging the creation and dissemination of creative works free from patronage, copyright
fosters an active, engaged citizenry and participatory democratic institutions).
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respective patron. 10 Copyright, by granting individuals economic rights in their
works, was meant to help solve this problem by providing authors with an
independent means by which to commercially exploit their works. 11 And in so
doing, society would benefit as the recipient of a more diverse set of creative
works. 12
Historically, then, patronage and copyright have often been viewed as at
odds, with copyright conceived of as an independent means by which to
eliminate the negative dependencies associated with patronage. While some
scholars recognize certain merits of patronage, even in those accounts
copyright and patronage are viewed as two different ways of encouraging
creative output, rather than as complementary in any significant way. 13
But conceptualizing copyright as an independent, sufficient system by
which to facilitate creative activity is both inaccurate and harmful. From the
inception of copyright, creative persons have depended on both copyright and a
variety of intermediaries -or patrons-in order to achieve the purposes of
copyright, namely, to promote the "Progress of Science and the useful Arts" by
facilitating creative activity. While the roles of such intermediaries may have
negative consequences in some respects, their significant involvement
nevertheless belies the founding mythology behind copyright.
In addition to being inaccurate, this conception of copyright as an
independent, sufficient system by which to facilitate creative activity is also
harmful because it tends to polarize debates on how to improve the broader
creative system. Copyright is often either cast as the enemy or savior, and
proposed solutions follow suit. But copyright, though meant to encourage
creative activity, does not itself directly translate into creative activity. Instead,
copyright is better conceptualized as one important factor in a series of inputs
to a broader creative system. Indeed, thinking of copyright as a standalone
system responsible for spurring creative activity overtaxes its capacities and
fails to explicitly take into account the interdependent realities of creative
activity. Conversely, conceptualizing copyright as an interdependent part of a
creative system provides a more useful framework for analyzing the role of
copyright, its interdependencies, and potential solutions to issues related to

creative processes.
This Article argues that because the broader creative system is increasingly

10. Macaulay, supra note 9.

ii. Id.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 9, at 408 (discussing patronage as an alternative to
copyright whose role in yielding creative output is credited); Mark S. Nadel, How Current
Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: the Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 845 (2004) (arguing that in many important cases patronage,
rather than copyright, has been the key to spurring creative activity); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Copyright Jor Functional Expression, 111IHARV. L. REv. 1149, 1233 -34 (1998) (identifying
patronage as an alternative to copyright that has helped yield creative activity).
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technological in nature, copyright is increasingly interdependent with
'Technological Patronage" in facilitating both creative and innovative
activities. This Article defines "Technological Patronage" as technological
support that many parties provide to the general public, often without an ex
ante financial impact on the recipient. Thus, in contrast to the founding and still
lingering conceptualization of copyright as an independent system by which to
facilitate creative activity, certain forms of Technological Patronage are
increasingly important in helping copyright satisfy its constitutional
prerogative. 14 And by the same token, copyright and the creative works that it
helps generate often spur technological innovation. This Article reviews several
examples of how Technological Patronage and copyright are increasingly
interdependent in facilitating both creative and innovative activities.
The interdependence between the two is further highlighted in examining
the roles that Technological Patrons play in helping solve some of copyright
law's thornier issues. Indeed, because of the tight interrelationship between
technological advancements and copyright law, Technological Patrons often
end up at the forefront of litigation and contractual efforts to answer some of
copyright law's most pressing issues. This Article examines some of these
efforts in further highlighting the interdependencies between copyright and
Technological Patronage in creative and innovative settings.
These interdependencies also provide grounds for better harmonizing
patent and copyright laws. That is, traditionally, copyright and patent laws have
been conceived as separate bodies of law with distinct purposes; copyright aims
to encourage "creativity," while patent law focuses on inventive activities. But
the interdependencies between creative and innovative activities reviewed in
this Article suggest that each body of law might be adjusted to better reflect
these interdependencies and thereby better support the purposes of the other.
Such interdependencies, of course, may also come with their warts. For
instance, Technological Patrons, when wielding too much power, may act in
ways that negatively affect society by restricting access to and production of a
diverse set of creative works. Amazon's recent spat with Hachette, where
Amazon restricted access to and eliminated discounts for some of the major
book publisher's offerings in response to a contractual breakdown, is just one
recent example. 15 YouTube's recent threat to shut independent record labels
out of the site unless they accede to new contractual terms is yet another. 16 But
such impasses do not appear to be the result of insufficient copyright
protections. Instead, they are, if anything, problems rooted in market
concentration. While current antitrust law may not adequately address all such
scenarios, it nonetheless remains the body of law most appropriate for them.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores both why many

14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8.
15. See infra Part IV.A.
16. See infra Part IV.B.

Winter 2015] COPYRIGHT'S TECHNOLOGICAL INTERDEPENDENCIES

195

commentators have traditionally argued that copyright is superior to a
patronage system, and the purported evils of patronage in general. Part II then
examines the growing importance of Technological Patronage. It argues that
copyright is increasingly interdependent with Technological Patronage in
facilitating diverse creative activity and promoting access to the results of that
activity. By the same token, the two also often work together in triggering
significant amounts of technological innovation. Thus, the traditional
dichotomy between patronage and copyright is a false one; copyright and
Technological Patronage are interdependent parts of a creative and innovative
system, and copyright is increasingly unable to meet its constitutional
prerogative on its own, particularly as the world grows increasingly
technological.
Part III then explores several different ways in which Technological
Patrons are helping solve particularly thorny problems in copyright law today,
including issues surrounding a digital first-sale right, digital fair use, and the
scope of copyright protection for software. Resolution of such legal issues is
also a form of patronage that ultimately can help facilitate both creative and
innovative activities.
Part IV then examines the ways in which Technological Patrons may harm
society by hindering the purposes behind copyright. It suggests that antitrust
law-rather than expanding copyright law-is often the most appropriate body
of law to address many of these possible ills because the problems arise from
market concentration, not from inadequate copyright protections.
Part V concludes by exploring some broader implications of the
interdependencies between creative and innovative activity discussed in the
Article. In particular, it suggests that copyright and patent laws, while
traditionally conceived as separate systems with distinct purposes, would be
well served with doctrinal changes that better reflect and facilitate the
interdependencies between creative and innovative activities.
I.

THE RISE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS A REMEDY TO PATRONAGE

The first copyright laws were enacted in part in order to help eliminate the
perceived ills of patronage in underwriting creative output. 17 The theory runs as
follows: so long as authors and artists remain dependent upon private and
public benefactors for their livelihoods, this dependence would limit both the
amount and diversity of creative output. In England, home of the first copyright
statute, the debates surrounding extension of the then copyright term include
some of the more frequently cited language from Lord Macaulay depicting the
evils of patronage:
I can conceive no system more fatal to the integrity and independence of
literary men than one under which they should be taught to look for their daily
17. See supra note 9.
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bread to the favour of ministers and nobles. I can conceive no system more
certain to turn those minds which are formed by nature
18 to the blessings and
ornaments of our species into public scandals and pests.
Copyright purportedly addresses these concerns by providing authors with
independence. In short, by endowing authors with property rights in their
works, copyright allows authors to put the fates of their works in the hands of
the broader market rather than a single patron. This "marketable right in one's
expression" thus encourages greater production of creative works. 19 As the
U.S. Supreme Court has noted:
The economic philosophy behind the copyright clause [of the U.S.
Constitution] ...is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best
2 0 way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors.
But copyright plays an additional role beyond merely encouraging
production of works; it also facilitates diversity in creative output because
authors are not beholden to their benefactors, who may otherwise exercise
restrictive influence on the nature of, and viewpoints expressed in, the creative
works. 2 1 In contrast, the "marketable right" that copyright provides allows
authors to express whatever viewpoint they deem fit. Neil Netanel thus
suggests that copyright is "a state measure that uses market institutions to
22
enhance the democratic character of civil society."
Despite these purported advantages, copyright remains an imperfect
solution, even in the estimation of those that first argued for copyright over
patronage. 2 3 For instance, in granting a quasi-monopoly over creative works,
copyright artificially restricts access to the goods and therefore raises the costs
that others must incur in order to obtain access to them. 2 4 Thus, while such
rights may incentivize authors to engage in creative activity, they may also
increase costs of access beyond what is required to provide the necessary

18. Macaulay, supra note 9.
19. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
20. Id. at 212, n.18 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201,219 (1954)).
21. Id. at 219 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558); Matthew Sag, Copyright and
Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1607, 1675 (2009); Netanel, supra note 9, at

288.
22. Netanel, supranote 9, at 335.
23. See Macaulay, supra note 9 (indicating that copyright is the lesser of two evils,
but, as a monopoly, still an evil).

24. See generally Guy A. Rub, ContractingAround Copyright: The Uneasy Case Jor
Unbundling of Rights in Creative Works, 78 U. Cmu. L. REv. 257 (2011) (discussing the
economic issue of deadweight loss that copyright law causes in general, and questioning in
particular whether the ability to unbundle copyright rights via contract helps reduce that
deadweight loss).
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incentives in the first place.
Furthermore, even if copyright facilitates the production of creative works,
it may not facilitate an ideal level of diversity among those works. Copyright
may thus share some of the same defects of which patronage is accused. For
instance, the marketplace can provide for its own form of hegemony, with some
noting that the market is "not notable for encouraging the variant and
unpopular." 25 The music and film industries in particular are often accused of
only supporting more mainstream creative works for obvious commercial
reasons, as discussed more fully below. 26 Sources of funding beyond copyright,
including some forms of patronage, 27may thus remain necessary in order to
promote an ideal range of viewpoints.
28
But as reflected in the world's intellectual property law regimes,
copyright remains a preferred system to patronage for both encouraging
production of and access to creative works and ensuring that a greater range of
viewpoints is found in those works. By opening the door to economic
independence, copyright purportedly frees creative output from the
dependencies with which it was once shackled.
II.

MARRYING COPYRIGHT AND PATRONAGE

But conceiving of copyright as a standalone economic system responsible
for society's creative output neglects to take into account its ongoing
dependencies. Indeed, the traditional dichotomy between copyright and
patronage belies the reality of how copyright and certain forms of
Technological Patronage intersect in the marketplace today. Rather than being
alternative, independent forms of encouraging creative output, copyright and
Technological Patronage are interdependent parts of a broader creative and
innovative system. Indeed, as the world grows increasingly technological, this
interdependence will only grow. And this growing interdependence suggests
that characterizations pitting copyright and technology as adversaries are
unhelpful to solving the issues that do arise in the dynamic between the two.
Instead, conceiving of the two as interdependent parts in the same creative and
innovative system reduces polarization while establishing a more useful
framework through which to understand their relationship.

Lloyd L. Weinreb, CopyrightJorFunctionalExpression, 111IHARV.L. REV. 1149,
(1998).
See infra Part II.
Weinreb, supra note 25, at 1233-34.
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR No. 38A: International Copyright Relations of
the United States 1 (2010) (reviewing the many international treaties that provide for some
form of copyright protection, and to which most of the countries of the world have acceded).
25.
1233-34
26.
27.
28.
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The Older Patrons

Forms of what might be called patronage have been prevalent as a
complement to copyright for some time. 29 In the music industry, for instance,
traditionally an artist's success has been heavily dependent on a record label's
promotion of and support for the artist. Copyright, then, may provide the
artist with an exploitable economic right, but support from record labels is, in
many cases, also necessary. Similar models have characterized other content
industries as well.31
Some suggest that this type of relationship is more accurately viewed as
one of investment rather than patronage. This may be so because, unlike
traditional forms of patronage, record labels, publishing houses, and the like
make substantial investments in the development, marketing, and commercial
success of new artists and bear the vast majority of financial risk in the event of
commercial failure. 32 Indeed, typically record labels, book publishers, and
others are assigned 33the copyright in the works and therefore become in effect
the content owners.
But regardless of whether these intermediaries are best described as patrons
or investors or some combination of both, many commentators nonetheless
view their roles as negative in important respects. 34 For instance, some suggest
that these intermediaries limit the diversification of creative works because they
focus their promotional efforts only on authors or works that appeal to broad

29. See David Nelson, Free the Music: Rethinking the Role of Copyright in an Age of
DigitalDistribution,78 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 565 (2005).
30. Lital Helman, Fair Trade Copyright, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 169-72 (2013)
(reviewing the important role that record labels play in producing music).

31. See, e.g., Lev Grossman, Books Gone Wild: The DigitalAge Reshapes Literature,
TiME (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1873122,00.html
(discussing a similar financing model in book publishing); Jared Wade, On Location: The
Risks of Movie Production, ALL BUSINESS (Dec. 1, 2004), http://cf.rims.org/
Magazine/PrintTemplate.cfm?AID=2574 (describing a similar financing model that exists in
the movie industry).

32. Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the Future of
Music, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 61,76 (2011).
33. Helman, supra note 30, at 161 (citing authorities that indicate that the copyrights
in sound recordings are typically owned by the record labels).
34. See generally Helman, supra note 30 (highlighting significant issues arising from
record labels' role in producing music, and arguing for a modified regime that would better
compensate the artists themselves); Neala Johnson, Q & A with Trent Reznor of Nine Inch
Nails, HERALD SUN, May 17, 2007, available at http://www.heraldsum.com.au/
entertainment/q-a-with-trent-reznor-of-nine-inch-nails/story-e6frf9h- 1111113550202; Peter

Lauria, Infringement! Artists Say They Want Their Music Site Dough, N.Y. POST, Feb. 27,
2008,
available
at
http://www.nypost.com/seven 02272008/business/infringement
99428.htm; Alan McGee, Recording Contract? Rip-Off You Mean, GUARDIAN MUSIC
BLOG
(Oct.
25,
2007),
http://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2007/oct/25/
alanmcgeethurspmpic.
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audiences. 35 Furthermore, because these intermediaries often end up owning
the copyright of the work through assignment from the author or otherwise
have contractual arrangements dependent on selling as many copies of the
creative works as possible, they expend significant
efforts restricting access to
36
the works in cases that may be legally ambiguous.
In short, though these types of intermediaries' investments in authors and
creative works may result in production of some creative works, their
involvement may in the end actually reduce access as well as limit the range of
works that the public consumes. In other words, this form of patronage appears
to result in many of the traditional ills of patronage. Thus in many cases, rather
than complementing copyright law in ways that have a net positive effect, these
forms of patronage may instead suffocate copyright's potential to encourage
greater production of and access to a wider range of creative works.
B.

The Barons of Technology

But a new set of intermediaries -Technological Patrons-is increasingly
encroaching on the turf of the old. Indeed, more and more consumers look to
the technological platforms that Technological Patrons provide in order to find
and access creative works. Most owners of creative works, therefore, rely on
such platforms in order to reach a significant number of consumers with their
works. And as these technological platforms have firmly taken root, the
production and provision of creative works has exploded, too. Thus,
Technological Patronage is increasingly important and necessary to allowing
greater access to, and encouraging production and diversification of, creative
works. And the commercial possibilities associated with producing and making
available creative works are a major reason behind the innovative efforts of
Technological Patrons in the first place.
Hence, rather than being competing or alternative models, Technological
Patronage and copyright are increasingly interdependent in a broader creative
system in bringing about copyright's purposes. And that interdependency also
means that copyright plays a significant role in triggering innovative activity.
The founding story behind copyright, in which copyright stars as an
independent means by which to rescue culture from the vices of patronage, is
thus no longer true today, if it ever were. Copyright is dependent in significant
ways on technology, and vice-versa, and this seems likely to become even more
so as the world grows more technological in nature.

35. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004);

Helman, surpa note 30, at 171-72 (describing homogeneity as an effect of record labels'
involvement in the music industry); Sleeping with the Enemy: Hollywood's Abusive
Relationship with Race, 1 GEo. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 41, 45-49 (2008)
(describing continuing homogeneity in the roles that minorities play in Hollywood films).
36. LESSIG, supra note 35, at 18-20.
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The following sections detail some of the more important categories of
Technological Patronage and the ways in which copyright is increasingly
interdependent with them in fostering greater creative and innovative activities
and access to the fruits thereof.
1.

Technology Development Kits

The last decade has witnessed an explosion of devices and technological
platforms -mobile and otherwise-that provide the public with a variety of
benefits. And one of the benefits that consumers increasingly expect is to be
able to access the books they read, the music they love, the videos they enjoy,
and other types of content on and through such technological platforns.
In order to facilitate this access, numerous technology companies provide
the public with what are called software and hardware development kits (for
37
purposes of this Article, "technology development kits" or "TDKs").
Companies provide these TDKs to developers and other content creators in
order to enable them to more readily create technology and other creative
works that can then be accessed through the company's or a partner's
technology platform. Access to the TDKs is typically free of charge, subject to
certain licensing terms.
To illustrate: Amazon provides developers and other content creators with
a number of TDKs that enable them to more readily create apps, content, and
other functionality for the Kindle e-book platforn as well as Amazon's line of
mobile devices. 38 They also provide a TDK for those interested in creating and
distributing apps through the Amazon Appstore for Android. 39 Similarly,
Google provides a TDK for Android as well as its app store, Google Play, as
does Apple for its App Store, iPhones, iPads, and various other hardware and
software products. Other technology companies provide TDKs for their lines
of hardware and software products for similar reasons.
These technology companies clearly have their own interests in mind when
providing this Technological Patronage to the public. For instance, the
companies typically take a cut of whatever a third party receives from the
consumer for apps or content sold through the companies' technology
37. See, e.g., Apple Developer Resources Site, https://developer.apple.com/ipad/sdk
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (Apple's iOS SDK); Android Developer Resources Site,
http: //developer.android.com/ sdk/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (Google's Android
SDK).
38. See,
e.g.,
Kindle
Development
Kit
Jor
Active
Content,
http://kdk.amazon.com/gp/public/gateway (last visited May 14, 2015) (Amazon's TDK for
Kindle);
Amazon
Fire
Devices
Developer
Site, https: //developer.amazon.com/
appsandservices /solutions/ devices /kindle-fire (Amazon's suite of development resources for
Kindle Fire, Amazon Fire TV, and Fire Phone) (last visited May 15, 2015).
39. See Amazon APIs, https://developer.amazon.com/appsandservices/apis (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015).
40. See Apple Developer Resources Site supra note 37.
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platforms. 4 1 And even when the apps or content are distributed free of charge,
the companies have other interests in providing the Technological Patronage,
such as increasing the overall attractiveness of its technology products and
increasing advertising revenue. But such commercial considerations simply
suggest that copyright and the creative works that it helps to generate are an
important impetus to developing TDKs and the underlying technological
platforms in the first place, thereby highlighting the interdependent relationship
between copyright and technological innovation.
And the overall effect of this fonn of Technological Patronage has been to
increase production of and access to a broader range of creative works. 4 2 TDKs
increase production of creative works by significantly reducing the amount of
time that it would otherwise take developers to create their apps and other
content. 43 Indeed, the number of both apps and developers creating44apps has
exploded over time and appears poised to continue to expand rapidly.
Furthermore, TDKs have helped spawn a wide array of creative content
representing a variety of viewpoints because Technological Patrons have
traditionally been largely agnostic about what types of creative works third
parties make available through their technology platforms. 45 To the extent that
creative works are deemed illegal or otherwise pose a serious public relations
risk to the company, a company may cut off its patronage in such cases. 4 6 But
overall, Technological Patrons have reasons to avoid discriminating against
specific developers when they can avoid it.4 7 Though there have been some

41. Tristan Louis, How Much Do Average Apps Make, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2013, 5:30
PM EDT), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tristanlouis/2013/08/10/how-much-do-average-appsmake (reviewing the amounts of revenue that many major technology companies receive
through app sales on their various platforms).
42. Panos Papadopoulos, Rise of the Mega SDK Vendors in Mobile, VISION MOBILE
(July 2, 2013), http://www.visionmobile.com/blog/2013/07/the-rise-of-the-mega-sdks-inmobile (reviewing, among other things, the role that SDKs have played in facilitating
creative activity by developers).
43. Id.
44. Chantal Tode, Mobile App Market Continues Its Meteoric Rise: Report, MOBILE
MARKETER
(Nov.
11,
2013),
http://www.mobilemarketer.com/cms/news/research/
16568.html (reviewing statistics on mobile app development that indicate rapid growth and
predictions of further expansion).
45. This is so despite the fact that companies typically retain, through their terms of
service, near absolute discretion in their ability to remove content from their platforms.
46. Austin Ruse, Google Out of Porn Biz?, BREITBART (June 6, 2014),
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Journalism/2014/06/06/Breaking-Google-Out-of-Pmrn-Biz;
Matt Williams, Apple Blocks 'Objectionable' App That Reports Deaths from US Drone
Strikes, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2012, 16:40 PM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2012/aug/30/apple-blocks-us-drone-strike-app.
47. Indeed, for a time Amazon.com was even reluctant to pull from its marketplace a
guide book for pedophiles, indicating that it "believe[d] it [was] censorship not to sell certain
books simply because we or others believe their message is objectionable." Although it
ultimately did remove the book in response to public outrage, its reluctance to do so and its
statement provide one clear example of what seems to have become a norm for digital
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well-documented instances of such discrimination, overall the record suggests
ongoing access to this form of Technological Patronage is more the norm than
the exception.
Last, TDKs have also increased consumers' access to creative works by not
only facilitating production of a wide array of creative works, but enabling
access to the works through the underlying technology platform. Indeed, the
various storefronts that now exist for most major technology platforms make
finding and accessing creative works relatively simple, 48 even if digital search
remains an imperfect art.
Thus, copyright and Technological Patronage in the form of TDKs exhibit
in several important respects a symbiotic relationship within the broader
creative system. Copyright provides content creators with a marketable right,
thereby encouraging creative activity. This creative activity and its commercial
possibilities, in turn, encourages Technological Patrons to engage in innovative
activity. The resulting TDKs and associated technology platforms then help
provide not only greater access to the creative works, but also tools with which
to more readily create additional content in which the marketable right subsists.
Indeed, this form of Technological Patronage has resulted in access to a wider
range of creative materials than copyright and its older set of intermediaries
have traditionally been able or willing to produce. 49 Hence, copyright and
Technological Patronage have worked together in several key areas to
ameliorate many of the purported ills of patronage in facilitating both creative
and innovative activities.
2.

Content Creation and Hosting Tools

In addition to TDKs, Technological Patrons provide the public with a host
of other types of tools and services that (1) assist would-be authors in
producing a wide range of creative works, and (2) promote public access to
such works. This section does not attempt to catalogue all of the tools and
services available, but instead highlights a representative few that illustrate
some of copyright's more important technological interdependencies in the
broader creative and innovation systems.
One well-known example is YouTube and similar services. YouTube
provides a variety of tools and services that aid users in creating and hosting
platforms: permissiveness. See Nick Saint, Amazon Caves: Pedophile Guide Pulledfrom the
Kindle
Store,
SFGATE
(Nov.
11,
2010,
4:00
AM
PST),
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Amazon-Caves -Pedophile-Guide-Pulled-From-The2472372.php.
48. The Rise ofMobile Application Stores: Gateways to the World ofApps, Booz &
Co.
(2010),
available
at
http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/
The Rise of Mobile Application Stores.pdf (reviewing the rise of app stores).
49. See, e.g., Floor64, The Sky Is Rising!, TECHDIRT (Jan. 2012), available at
https://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising/ (reviewing the growth of content in absolute volume
and suggesting that consumers have increasingly more content choices).
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content on its site. 50 Competing video sharing websites do as well. 5 1 And
statistics suggest that such services have been immensely successful in both
facilitating creation of content and promoting access thereto.
For instance, in terms of access, over one billion unique users visit
YouTube each month in order to watch over six billion hours of video-nearly
an hour for every person on Earth. 52 A majority of teenagers today also obtain
their music through YouTube. 53 Other sites also register significant traffic,
54
though on a much smaller scale in comparison to YouTube.
In terms of content creation, users upload approximately 100 hours of
video to YouTube every minute. 55 Other sites also experience significant
activity. 56 Clearly, Google's and others' technologies are not solely responsible
for the creation of uploaded and viewed footage; the economic incentives
associated with copyright likely play a role for many content creators. But the
technological tools that Google and others provide have certainly helped
facilitate the creative activity and access thereto.
Technological Patrons such as Amazon, Apple, and others also provide a
variety of tools for self-publishing books and other forms of literature.
Amazon, for instance, provides services that allow authors to skip traditional
publishing houses and produce and distribute literary works on demand. 57
Amazon and other companies involved in the e-Book world also provide
authors with technological tools that facilitate production and distribution of
electronic versions of their literary works, which have become increasingly

50. See, e.g., Working Together: An Overview of YouTube's Resources Jor Creators,
YouTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/creators/creator-benefits.html (last visited May 15,
2015).
51. Create Something New, VimEo, http://vimeo.com/create (last visited May 15,
2015) (providing an overview of the video creation tools that Vimeo, a competitive service
to YouTube, offers).
52. Statistics, YouTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited
May 15,2015).
53. Ben Richmond, YouTube Is About to Do to Record Labels What Amazon Does to
Publishers, MOTHERBOARD (June 17, 2014, 1:45 PM EST), http://motherboard.vice.com/
en us /read/ youtube-is -about-to-do-to-record-labels -what-amazon-does -to-publishers
(indicating that 64% of teenagers access music through YouTube, more than any other
source).
54. Eric Larson, 5 Reasons to Choose Vimeo Instead of YouTube, MASHABLE (May 30,
2013), http://mashable.com/2013/05/30/vimeo-over-youtube (indicating that roughly 70
million unique users visit Vimeo each month).
55. Statistics, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited
July 21, 2014).
56. Sam Gutelle, Vimeo Users Streamed 4.9 Billion Videos In 2013, TUBEFILTER (Jan.
27, 2014), http://www.tubefilter.com/2014/01/27/vimeo-5-billion-views-2013-timeline.
57. See, e.g., CreateSpace, https://www.createspace.com/pub/1/diy.do?ref=1383688&
utm id=6072&cp=70170000000c3cK&ls =Amazon&sls=Amazon Selfpub (last visited July
21, 2014) (providing an overview of Amazon' s suite of technologies and services for selfpublishing literary works).
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58
important in the digital age.
Such tools and services have thus helped spawn diverse creative activity
and enhanced access thereto in a way that copyright, on its own, could not.
Indeed, some accounts suggest that today's world generates in days the same
amount of content that, previous to 2003, was generated in the entire history of
the world.59 Other accounts indicate that not only does more content exist, but
more people are earning money from that content than ever before, and
consumers spend an ever increasing amount of their disposable income on
consuming such content. And tools and services 6 1such as those described
above play a vital role in bringing about these results.

Copyright, of course, still remains important as part of the broader creative
system. Copyright provides prospective authors with a marketable, enforceable
set of rights that must be taken seriously by both the Technological Patrons as
well as consumers. Furthermore, copyright's interdependence with
Technological Patronage means that copyright plays a significant role in
spurring innovative activity. Indeed, a basic incentive for developing such
technologies in the first place is the institution of copyright and the commercial
possibilities that copyrighted creative works, in conjunction with the
technologies, present. To such ends, Technological Patronage in today's world
expands copyright's capacities by enabling more parties to create more creative
works that are then accessible to a broader audience.
3.

TechnologicalMoney

In addition to providing technological tools and platforms for third parties
to create and showcase their works, in some cases Technological Patrons also
simply subsidize consumer access to creative works on their technology
platforms. For instance, members of the Amazon Prime program-which
requires a nominal $99 per year fee-obtain free (to them) access to a large
number of creative works through Amazon Instant Video and the Kindle eBook platforms. 6 2 In order to provide this free access, Amazon almost
undoubtedly pays content owners in some form on behalf of consumers. In so
doing, Amazon and other companies thus patronize content owners-and
thereby encourage increased production and access to creative works -in order

58. See, e.g., Kindle Direct Publishing, http://www.amazonkdp.com (last visited July
21, 2014) (providing an overview of Amazon's self-publishing tools for its Kindle e-Reader
technologies).
59. Brett King, Too Much Content: A World of Exponential Information Growth,
HUFFINGTON POST TECH (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brett-king/toomuch-content-a-world- b 809677.html.
60. Floor64, supra note 49.
61. Id.
62. The nominal fee charged for the program does not even begin to cover the costs
that consumers would otherwise incur in accessing what is available through the program.
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to provide their customers with enhanced technological products and services.
Other examples of such subsidization include Apple's iTunes Match
63
program, which, like Amazon Prime, requires a nominal fee to participate.
This program allows users to store in the cloud and access from anywhere any
music that they have, including music not purchased through Apple. 6 4 In order
to be able to provide consumers with this type of access, Apple almost certainly
struck some type of commercial agreement with record labels. 6 5 Netflix's and
Amazon's funding of original films and TV series in order to attract consumers
to their technological platforns is yet another example of similar
66
subsidization.
Hence, in some cases Technological Patrons engage in a more traditional
form of patronage by directly subsidizing the creation and distribution of
creative works, all on behalf of their customers. Nonetheless, copyright and
technology's interdependencies are still clear in such cases. Technological
Patrons provide the subsidy in order to increase the lure of their own
technological products. The creation and promotion of these technological
products thus directly leads to the creation and promotion of creative works.
And the commercial prospects associated with copyrighted creative works
makes creating and promoting such technological products worthwhile in the
first place. Thus, while Technological Patrons clearly have their own
commercial purposes in mind, technological innovation and copyright
complement each other in such cases (1) as part of the broader creative system
in bringing about increased production of and access to a more diverse set of
creative works; and (2) in facilitating innovative activity.
4.

Free and Open Source Software

Another significant form of Technological Patronage in the software world
consists of the free and open source software (FOSS) movement. In short,
FOSS is software provided under a variety of license terms whose most critical
condition is that the software comes with access to the source code-or human

63. See iTunes Match, https://www.apple.com/itunes/itunes-match/ (last visited May
15, 2015) (providing an overview of the program).
64. Id.
65. Again, the nominal fee to participate would in no way cover the amounts that
would otherwise be due to record labels for the copies stored and streamed from the cloud.
66. See, e.g., Emily Steel, Netflix Bolsters Offerings in Documentary Genre, N.Y.
TiMEs (July 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/business/media/netflix-bolstersofferings -in-documentary-genre.html? r=0 (discussing Netflix's plans to contribute an
additional $3 billion dollars to developing original content in order to lure subscribers to its
services); Mark Sullivan, Amazon Will Spend $100M on New, Original Shows in Q3,
VENTURE BEAT (July 24, 2014 4:00 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/07/24/amazon-willspend- 00m-on-new -original -shows -in-q3/ (discussing Amazon's significant financial
commitments to developing original content for its technological platform).
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readable- version of the software. 6 7 Source code is valuable because it is
essentially the detailed blueprint of how the software works, and subsequent
software engineers possessing it can more easily make
alterations and additions
68
to the software program in order to improve upon it.
The FOSS movement has been exceptionally successful, 69 so much so that
some claim that the open nature of the FOSS development model is now the
norn in the software world.70 Vast numbers of FOSS programs are available
under pennissive license terms to anyone desiring access to the technology.
Indeed, some of the most popular software technologies in the world, including
Android, Firefox, and Linux, are FOSS. And, again, this access is typically not
subject to a licensing fee, as is the case with more traditional forms of
proprietary software.
Companies and other entities have a variety of reasons for providing this
71
form of Technological Patronage. Some provide it for commercial reasons.
Indeed, many successful businesses have been built around FOSS; Red Hat is
an example of a billion dollar company that largely sells services related to a
FOSS product, a form of the Linux operating system in its case. Others provide
the patronage for non-economic reasons,
including for prestige enhancement or
72
simply out of the love of creativity.
Copyright law has played and continues to play an important role in
facilitating this Technological Patronage. For instance, access to FOSS is
provided through copyright licenses. The founders of the FOSS movement used
copyright to promote their vision of free access by creating copyright licenses
that sought to turn copyright on its head.73 That is, some of the most important
FOSS licenses require that, as a condition of use, any subsequent works that
use or incorporate the FOSS be subject to the same permissive licensing
terns. 74 Other licenses simply license the FOSS to anyone wanting7 access
to it.
5
In both cases, however, the basis of the licenses remains copyright.
Hence, the Technological Patronage provided through the FOSS movement
has depended critically on copyright. While I have argued elsewhere that

67. See Clark D. Asay, A Case Jor the Public Domain, 74 Omio ST. L.J. 753, 759
(2013).
68. James A.J. Wilson, Benefits of Open Source Code, OSS WATCH (May 9, 2013),
http://oss-watch.ac.uk/resources/whoneeds source.
69. See Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L. REv. 431, 442
(2015).
70. Katherine Noyes, Open Source Software Is Now a Norm in Businesses, PCWoRLD
(May 18, 2011, 10:07 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/228136/open source software
now a norm in businesses.html (citing to a report that indicates that open source software
has gone "mainstream" in the business world).
71. Asay, supra note 67, at 762-65.
72. Id.

73. Moglen, supranote 4.
74. Asay, supra note 67, at 759-61.
75. Id.
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copyright may not be as crucial to the success of the movement going forward
as traditional accounts suggest, at least early on, the movement probably could
76
not have survived without copyright as a basis for its licensing scheme.
Accordingly, copyright law and the FOSS movement's Technological
Patronage have been interdependent complements to each other in yielding
enhanced creativity and innovation in the software world.
The FOSS movement facilitates this enhanced creativity and innovation in
a number of ways. First, the FOSS movement increases access to creative and
innovative software works. Indeed, one of the primary purposes of the
movement is to permit access to the source code to anyone wanting it. And a
variety of readily accessible platforms exist that make locating and obtaining
FOSS relatively simple. 77 Almost by definition, then, the FOSS movement
promotes greater access to creative and innovative software works.
This access increases the production of additional creative and innovative
output. For instance, the extensive number of freely available FOSS projects
allows developers to skip recreating the wheel and more easily build upon what
already exists. 7 8 In other words, subsequent developers can focus on improving
upon and adding to the underlying works rather than having to first build them
themselves. 7 9 And this freed-up development time results in increased
production of software content.
It also facilitates a greater diversity of works in the software realm because
each developer can access the wealth of freely available FOSS projects and
move in whatever new direction they deem fit. Naturally, the market may play
a role in steering developers away from a diversity that the market will not
support. But overall, diversity of software goods still likely increases, even
when a dominant software product develops.
Take Linux, for instance. 80 This famous FOSS project now powers much

76. See generally Asay, supra note 67. But see also Greg R. Vetter, A Public Domain
Approach to Free and Open Source Software, 75 Oio S. L.J. 8 (2014) (highlighting several
concerns with moving away from an intellectual property law-based approach for fostering
open innovation).
77. See, e.g., Comparison of Open-Source Software Hosting Facilities, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison of open-source software hosting facilities
(last
visited May 15, 2015).
78. Howard Baldwin, 4 Reasons Companies Say Yes to Open Source,
COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 6, 2014, 6:30 AM ET), http://www.computerworld.com/s/
article/9244898/4 reasons companies say yes to open source?taxonomyld=ll&pageNu
mber=1 (suggesting that a primary reason that parties use FOSS is the cost savings of not
having to recreate the software works themselves).
79. Id.
80. Google's Android FOSS project is yet another example. Google supports and
maintains the official version of Android that is used on many smartphones and tablets. But
Amazon and others have created their own branches of Android for their technology
products. And they haven't simply copied Google's Android, but instead have altered it
significantly in order to match their needs and provide a different experience to their users.
Thus, access to the underlying works allows not only for the use thereof, but production of a

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY AND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:189

of the computing world. Numerous parties have created a number of versions
of Linux for a variety of computing environments, from embedded devices, to
desktops, to phones, to cars. 81 Access to the underlying work has thus allowed
for increased production of creative works as well as diversification of them.
Some might argue that this access has actually resulted in hegemony because
Linux is now so dominant in many areas of software that other creative options
are foreclosed. But that is true only insofar
as the many variants of Linux are
82
case.
the
not
is
which
product,
same
the
In sum, the FOSS movement is another example of copyright law and
Technological Patronage complementing each other in ways that yield
increased production of and access to a more diverse set of creative and
innovative works. The software industry increasingly depends on FOSS in
order to spur innovation and creativity, and the FOSS movement continues to
utilize copyright in promoting its vision. Indeed, because of the FOSS
movement's success, some have advocated
mimicking its tenets in other sectors
83
in hopes of achieving similar results.
5.

Some Possible Technological Warts

The relationship between the types of Technological Patronage reviewed
above and copyright includes some possible deficiencies that are worth
mentioning at this point. While none of these appear to be detrimental to the
arguments of this Article, they are noted both in order to briefly address some
typical counterarguments as well as to better illustrate the boundaries of the
Article's arguments.
First, some argue that the types of Technological Patronage reviewed

more diverse set of works as well. See Ewan Spence, Why Has Amazon Risked Distraction
By Releasing The Fire Smartphone?, FORBES (July 7, 2014, 8:25 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ewanspence/2014/07/07/why-has-amazon-risked-distractionby-releasing-the-fire-smartphone (summarizing how Amazon has used a differentiated
version of Android for its own devices).
81. Graham Morrison, The Hidden Places Where Linux Dominates, TECHRADAR (Jan.
29, 2011), http://www.techradar.com/us/news/computing/the-lidden-places-where-linuxdominates -923626; Christopher Tozzi, Automotive Grade Linux Released for Open Source
Cars, THE VAR GuY (July 1, 2014), http://thevarguy.com/open-source-application-softwarecompanies/070114/automotive-grade-linux-released-open-source-cars.
82. See, e.g., Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, The 5 Most Popular Linux Distributions,
ZDNET (Aug. 26, 2012, 15:55 PDT), http://www.zdnet.com/the-5-most-poptlar-linuxdistributions-7000003183 (discussing five of the most popular Linux distributions just for
desktops).
83. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 582-83, 611 (2011)
(arguing that an open model of innovation in the field of personal robotics is necessary in
order for the field to reach its potential). See generally John R. Ackermann, Toward Open
Source Hardware, 34 U. DAYTON L. REv. 183, 183-85 (2009) (discussing efforts to apply
open license principles to hardware development generally).
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above have facilitated the creation of and access to too much content. 84 In other
words, while the copious amounts of available content may seem like a boon,
in reality consumers suffer as they are forced to sift through excessive 85amounts
of content in search of a limited number of worthwhile creative works.
While such concerns may have some merit -particularly if the overall
quality of content available suffers at the expense of increased quantity-it is
hard to grant such concerns too much weight. First, the complaint itself
suggests that copyright, in conjunction with Technological Patronage, is
working rather well in promoting "the progress of Science and the useful Arts"
by facilitating increased production of and access to creative and innovative
works. The complaint, therefore, confirms the interdependencies between the
two in the broader creative and innovative systems.
Second, if consumer expenditures on creative works are any indication of
favorable quality, it appears that consumers are finding and purchasing more
quality content than ever before. 8 6 And this remains true even if the majority of
expenditures focus on a limited set of creative works, since interdependence
between copyright and Technological Patronage in promoting copyright's
purposes does not mandate that all works be created commercially equal.
The more challenging critique of the types of Technological Patronage
outlined above is that they actually undermine copyright by (1) facilitating
copyright infringement, and (2) undermining creative persons' ability to earn a
living. If these two related points are true, than Technological Patronage may
ultimately do more harm than good by disincentivizing creative persons from
engaging in creative activity. Rather than being productively interdependent,
therefore, copyright and Technological Patronage may be at odds, as some
commentators suggest. These are complex, interrelated issues, and it is beyond
the scope of this to address them completely. But both concerns will be touched
upon briefly in order to better illustrate the arguments of this Article.
Concerns about technological advancements undermining creative persons'
ability to earn a living have been prevalent for some time. Some argue, for
instance, that music-streaming services like Spotify and Pandora pay artists so
little that many otherwise talented artists are opting out of the industry
entirely. 8 7 Similar complaints have been lobbied against Amazon's effect on
84. See, e.g., Dougald Hine, What Good Is Injormation, AEON MAGAZINE (Mar. 6,
2014),
http://aeon.co/magazine/living-together/the-problem-with-too-much-information/
(arguing that the flood of content that is now available can contribute to a lack of meaning in
life).
85. See, e.g., Paul Barclay, The Myth of the Long Tail, BIG IDEAS (Feb. 22, 2014, 6:00
AM),
http:/ /www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/bigideas/the-myth-of the-longtail/5275658 (reviewing the conclusions of a study by Harvard Business School Professor
Anita Elberse in which she found that, while more content exists today, consumers generally
still focus on a small number of creative works).
86. See supra note 49.

87. Scott Timberg, It's Not Just David Byrne and Radiohead: Spotify, Pandora and
How Streaming Music Kills Jazz and Classical, SALON (July 20, 2014, 2:00 PM MDT),
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the book industry. 88 Indeed, others argue more generally that a culture of free
or cheap content has mainly enriched Technological Patrons while
impoverishing the middle classes of creators. 89 These complaints have a
common theme: if Technological Patronage continues to devalue content, then
those currently producing it will eventually cease to do so.
A few responses are in order. First, this Article argues that copyright and
Technological Patronage are interdependent in facilitating enhanced creative
activity and access thereto; an important implication of that argument is that
copyright remains a significant part of the equation, even if not the only part.
Hence, copyright remains vital in giving creative parties the ability to police
their works and prevent piracy thereof, thereby preserving value.
As such, a second and related point is that legacy business models, rather
than Technological Patronage, may be the cause of some of the purported
devaluing of content. For instance, in the music industry, artists have long
assigned their copyrights to record labels in order to obtain their promotional
support. But in giving up these rights, artists lose the ability to control their
creative works' fates. With such rights, record labels may act in their own
commercial interests, while neglecting those of individual artists, in striking
deals with Technological Patrons that allow for the musical works to be
streamed.
Such instances of devaluation may thus be more the result of defects in
legacy business models becoming amplified in the digital economy than
inherent defects in the digital economy itself. Furthermore, such scenarios
illustrate that copyright remains a valuable set of rights, but one that must be
smartly utilized in order to preserve productive interdependencies between
copyright and Technological Patronage. In other words, the dependencies
between copyright and Technological Patronage are not infallible, even if they
are increasingly inevitable.
Third, some instances of devaluation may be the result of scenarios where
a Technological Patron wields too much power in a given field. In other words,
such instances are problems of market concentration rather than deficient rights
under copyright or inherent problems with technology itself. In such cases, as
discussed later, antitrust law is probably the most appropriate solution to
helping maintain a competitive landscape.
Related to the concern that Technological Patronage tends to devalue
content, many claim that Technological Patronage actually undermines
copyright by facilitating copyright infringement. That is, since services such as
http://www.salon.com/2014/07/20/its not just david byrne and radiohead spotify pandor
a and how streaming music kills jazz and classical/.
88. Tim Waterstone, Amazon Is Discounting Us to Death, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 6,
2012, 1:00 PM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/06/amazondestroy-britain-book-industry.
89. See ASTRA TAYLOR, THE PEOPLE'S PLATFORM: TAKING BACK POWER AND CULTURE
IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Fourth Estate 2014).
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YouTube and others facilitate creation and distribution of content, potential
infringers similarly have an easier time using the service to create and host
infringing content. As a result, creative parties lose needed revenues, the
content itself is devalued in the eyes of the consuming public, and creative
parties opt out of the creative system altogether.
Furthermore, aspects of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA")
may exacerbate such problems. By providing services such as YouTube a broad
safe harbor against secondary copyright liability for hosting infringing
materials so long as certain conditions are met, the DMCA may make it even
more likely that such services undermine the ability of copyright owners to
obtain the necessary monetary awards for creating works. In this view, this type
of Technological Patronage is no patronage at all, but instead deals copyright a
significant blow in its ability to encourage production of a diverse set of
creative works.
But such arguments do not hold up to scrutiny. First, as discussed above,
this type of Technological Patronage leads to creation of and access to works
that otherwise would neither exist nor be available. In other words, this form of
Technological Patronage has helped create access to creative works that
copyright law, on its own or even in conjunction with other intermediaries,
could not. So for a whole category of content creators, this form of
Technological Patronage helps yield significant numbers of works, and
copyright law ensures that, once created, these creators have a marketable set of
rights should they wish to exploit them. In this light, copyright and
Technological Patronage's interdependencies are not only clear, but also
productive.
Second, many content owners that may not need Technological Patronage
in order to create their works still benefit from it by obtaining a greater
audience for their works. Indeed, most major studios and content providers
have some sort of presence on YouTube and other such services. 90 So while
digital services such as YouTube may have made copyright infringement easier
to commit, one logical corollary to increased access to creative content is
enhanced abilities to monetize it, thereby further highlighting the
interdependencies of the two.
And third, though such services may make copyright infringement easier to
commit, to some extent the DMCA itself helps counterbalance that concern.
For instance, such services are not eligible for the safe harbor under the DMCA
unless the service owners expeditiously remove allegedly infringing content
once notified by the content owner. 91 The safe harbor is so valuable to
companies that, in most cases, the service provider will simply remove

90. See generally Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-GeneratedContent, 2008 U. ILL.
L. REv. 1459 (2008) (discussing generally major content owners' growing partnerships with
sites such as YouTube).
91. 17U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
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materials from their site upon receiving a notification, even in cases where the
notification may not actually be legally justified. 92 Furthermore, though
services such as YouTube have no clear legal obligation to actively monitor
their sites for infringing material, some 9have
implemented technologies to
3
detect and ferret out cases of infringement.
In sum, though services such as YouTube certainly result in copyright
infringement, this type of Technological Patronage appears to aid copyright law
in facilitating increased production of and access to a wider variety of creative
content, which in turn increases monetization opportunities. Furthermore,
despite the threat of copyright infringement, the DMCA as currently
implemented provides copyright owners with tools with which to help combat
it. And last, services such as YouTube have actively implemented tools to help
identify and prevent instances of copyright infringement. This is not to claim
that copyright and technology's interdependencies are always in perfect
harmony, but it is to say that the current system provides some important tools
that help maintain a productive relationship between the two.
6.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion highlights several important ways in which
Technological Patronage is interdependent with copyright in yielding increased
production of and access to a greater diversity of creative works. The
complementary nature of the two stands in contrast to traditional accounts of
the relationship between patronage and copyright. Copyright and content
owners today depend critically on Technological Patrons in order to succeed in
the marketplace. And Technological Patrons depend critically on content
owners for the success of their own technology products as well. While content
owners have long feared the effects of technology in eroding their business
models by facilitating piracy, the reality has become that content owners are
increasingly beholden to the copious amounts of Technological Patronage that
they today receive. And, in many important respects, these interdependencies
appear to serve well the interests of copyright and technological innovation
alike.
III.

TECHNOLOGICAL PATRONS' ROLE IN SOLVING COPYRIGHT DILEMMAS

So far this Article has explored several examples of where Technological
Patronage is interdependent with copyright in yielding increased production of
92. Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability For Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1883

(2000).
93. Bryan E. Arsham, Monetizing Infringement: A New Legal Regime Jor Hosts of
User-Generated Content, 101 GEO. L.J. 775, 791 (2013) (discussing YouTube's selfimposed implementation of copyright infringement monitoring technologies).
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and access to a diverse set of creative works and technological products.
Part III turns to the role that Technological Patrons play in helping address
some of copyright's most pressing legal issues. This role is natural given the
interrelationship between the Patrons' technological products and various forms
of content and, thus, further highlights the interdependencies between
Technological Patronage and copyright in creative and innovative contexts.
A. The First-Sale Doctrine'sDigital Dilemma
One significant area of copyright law in which Technological Patrons have
and will continue to play a role is the first-sale doctrine. This doctrine is an
exception to the general rights of copyright holders. It dictates that once a
copyright owner has made an authorized first sale of a copy of a copyrighted
work, the owner of that copy has the right to further dispose of it without
having to obtain authorization from the copyright owner. 94 This exception is
necessary because, otherwise, the owner of a copy of a book would violate the
author's distribution right when giving away that copy to another. 95 The firstsale doctrine thus enables things such as used bookstores,9 6 libraries, and many
other important secondary markets for copyrighted works.
The first-sale doctrine, furthermore, has recently received a boost from the
U.S. Supreme Court. In its recent Kirtsaeng opinion, the Court ruled that the
first-sale doctrine includes no geographic limitations. 97 In other words, even if
a copyrighted work was originally produced and distributed outside the United
States, so long as the copyright owner authorized the first distribution of that
copy of the work, the recipient of the copy can then dispose of it as she wishes,
including importing it into the United States. 98 Some suggest that this ruling
will harm copyright owners, whose ability to geographically price discriminate
will be significantly curtailed as a result. 99 Be that as it may, the Kirtsaeng
decision helped cement the first-sale doctrine as an important exception to the
exclusive rights that the Copyright Act grants copyright holders.
But as more and more content has entered the digital realm, application of
the first-sale doctrine has become less certain. This is so because a number of
circuit courts have interpreted the Copyright Act to allow for evasion of the

94. See 17 U.S.C. § 109. See generally Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital
Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REv. 889, 908-12 (2011) (providing a general overview of the
history of the first-sale doctrine).
95. See generally Clark D. Asay, Kirtsaeng and the First-Sale Doctrine's Digital
Problem, 66 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE 17 (2013).
96.

Id.

97. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 135 (2013).
98. Id.
99. See generally Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741
(2015) (arguing that copyright owners should be able to prevent importation of copyrighted
works in order to enable effective price discrimination).
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first-sale doctrine when copyright owners label the sale of copies of their works
as a "license" to the work. 100 In such cases, the first-sale doctrine does not
apply, according to these courts, since the doctrine only applies when someone
"owns" a copy of a copyrighted work. 10 1 In some circuits, therefore, digital
content owners are able to eliminate the first-sale doctrine through careful
structuring of their agreements with consumers.
As such, the first-sale doctrine faces a digital dilemma. Some may believe
that it faces no such dilemma because the infinitely reproducible nature of
digital works means that applying the doctrine in the digital context would
completely undermine the ability of copyright owners to commercialize those
works. After all, physical products have limited lifespans. So even with
secondary markets for physical products, somewhat frequent sales of new
products are necessary to replenish those markets. With digital products, by
contrast, no such necessity exists because the products may not similarly
degrade over time. In consequence, content owners would presumably lose
significant numbers of sales for their digital works should a digital first-sale
right exist.
These concerns certainly have merit, but they are not a justification for
eliminating the first-sale doctrine in the digital context altogether. 102 Rather, if
anything, these concerns justify making adjustments to the first-sale doctrine in
the digital context. 10 3 Of course, some may still believe that the first-sale
doctrine is currently too broad, whether applied to physical or digital products.
But again, even if the doctrine is currently too broad, that is not a justification
for eliminating the doctrine in the digital space, but rather for limiting the
doctrine in its application to both the physical and digital spheres.
So what's the solution? For political economy reasons, Congress seems
unlikely to amend the Copyright Act to explicitly mandate that the first-sale
doctrine applies in the digital context. And until it does so, courts are stuck with
the current language of the Copyright Act, a reasonable interpretation of which
allows for easy evasion of the first-sale doctrine, as described above.
Technological Patrons, on the other hand, may be better situated than
others to ensure that the first-sale doctrine-or some form thereof -survives
the digitization of content. Because Technological Patrons provide content
owners with increasingly essential technological platforms through which
consumers access creative works, these Technological Patrons have significant
leverage vis-A-vis even the biggest of content owners. Indeed, these Patrons
have in the past shown the ability to secure enhanced permissions for and
100. See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2010). For an
overview of the variety of approaches courts have taken to making this determination, see
generally Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership:First
Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887 (2010).
101. Carver, supra note 100.
102. Asay, supra note 95.
103. Id.
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access to content that content owners, on their own, may have been reluctant
to
104
grant and which copyright law, as currently interpreted, does not mandate.
Furthermore, some of the biggest concerns with a digital right of first-sale
may be most readily solved in the context of a contractual relationship between
Technological Patrons and content owners. For instance, as mentioned, some of
the primary concerns with a digital first sale fight are that, unlike physical
products, digital copies do not degrade over time and thus can be replicated in
105
perfect condition and transferred an infinite number of times.
The contractual terms and conditions between Technological Patrons and
content owners could help address some of these concerns. Furthermore, while
some instances of piracy will occur no matter what solutions are adopted,
technological solutions for allowing transfers of works while ensuring that the
transferor does not retain a copy can be built and, indeed, already exist today.
The following sections describe several examples in which Technological
Patrons have helped or may help facilitate application of some form of the firstsale doctrine in the digital sphere. Of course, the opposite possibility also
exists, and Part IV infra discusses the role that antitrust law may play in
ensuring that Technological Patrons do not become an obstacle, rather than a
conduit, to production of and access to creative content.
1.

E-Book Lending

As the largest book and e-book distributor in the world, Amazon holds
significant sway in the world of commercial literature. 106 Other notable online

104. For instance, in the digital music sphere, early on Apple was able to convince
major record labels to make their works available on and through Apple's hardware and
software products, subject only to a lightweight digital rights management ("DRM")
technology that is relatively simple to bypass. Amazon followed suit by convincing the
labels to make their music titles available via Amazon without DRM at all. Apple, Amazon,
Google, and others have also struck deals with the major music publishers to allow for
cloud-based streaming and storage of music; Amazon even permitted this functionality
before getting explicit agreement from the content owners. We take much of this for granted
now, but without the involvement of these companies, it is unlikely that this type of access
would be available today.
105. See Jonathan C. Tobin, Licensing as a Means of Providing Affordability and
Accessibility in Digital Markets: Alternatives to a DigitalFirst Sale Doctrine, 93 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 167, 177-84 (2011) (discussing generally problems associated with
a digital first-sale right).
106. Such power was manifest in the e-book sphere in 2010 and earlier, when Amazon
was able to sign agreements with most of the major publishing houses that allowed Amazon
to set the retail price of the e-books. That meant that, though the publishing houses sold
books to Amazon at whatever wholesale price the parties agreed to, Amazon could sell the
book to consumers at a lower price, which it did in many cases. Publishers disliked this
because, in their view, it tended to lessen the value of books in the minds of the consuming
public. But Amazon preferred it for a variety of reasons, in part at least because the company
was thereby able to get consumers hooked into their digital ecosystem. And given Amazon's
significant market share, there was little the publishers could do until another behemoth
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e-Book retailers include Barnes & Noble, Apple, Google, and Sony. 107 Because
content owners increasingly depend on these companies to provide access to
their creative content, these Technological Patrons have been able to offer their
consumers certain rights that, while not the same as a digital first-sale right,
nonetheless approximate it in certain respects.
For instance, both Amazon and Barnes & Noble offer book-lending
functionality through their products, meaning that certain e-book titles are
eligible to be transferred to others for their use. For Amazon customers, the
lending period is currently fourteen days, and any such title may be 109
lent only
one time. 108 Lending terms for Barnes & Noble customers are similar.
Thus, despite Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and the publishers labeling
consumers' access to e-book titles as a license rather than a transfer of
ownership to a copy of the work-and thereby eliminating the absolute
application of the first-sale doctrine-Amazon and Barnes & Noble have
worked with publishers to grant consumers some quasi-first-sale rights.
Admittedly, this lending right is not nearly as broad as an absolute first-sale
right. But it is more than what the content owners on their own might otherwise
offer.
These Technological Patrons have also helped enable another important
secondary market that the first-sale doctrine in the physical world permits:
libraries. Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and others have worked together with
thousands of public libraries across the United States to enable e-book lending
from those libraries.11° The number of titles available in this format from any
given library differs significantly, and some libraries do not yet provide for ebook lending at all.111 Nonetheless, despite these limitations, these digital
libraries provide further evidence of the influence that these Technological
Patrons exert in altering content owners' behavior in favor of some quasi-firstsale rights.
Of course, such influence has its limits. Technological Patrons have not yet

entered the fray, which Apple did in 2011, only to be accused itself by the Department of
Justice of antitrust violations for colluding with the publishers to set e-book prices.
107. eBook Retailers, EBOOK ARCHITECTS, http://ebookarchitects.com/learn-aboutebooks/retailers/ (last visited May 15, 2015).
108. See Lend or Borrow Kindle Books, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html/ref=hp rel topic?ie=UTF8&nodeld=200549320 (last visited May 15, 2015).
109. See How Do I Lend and Borrow a Book, http://bookclubs.bamesandnoble.com/
t5/NOOK-First-Edition-Technical/How-do-I -lend-and-borrow -a-book/td-p/552254
(last
visited May 15, 2015).
110. Borrow Books from a Public Library, AMAzON.coM, http://www.amazon.com/
gp/help/customer/display.html/?nodeld=200747550 (last visited May 15, 2015) (detailing
how consumers can borrow books from public libraries via Kindle technology); Digital
Borrowing, http://www.barnesandnoble.com/u/library-sideload-digital/379003794/
(last
visited May 15, 2015) (detailing how consumers can borrow books from public libraries via
Barnes & Noble's Nook technology).
111. Id.
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been able to secure an absolute first-sale right for their customers, and it may
not be in their interest to do so. After all, they, too, lose profit when titles are
repeatedly transferred among customers without payment. Thus, though
Technological Patrons may have been effective in bringing about through
private ordering what politics renders nearly impossible, their own commercial
interests may stand in the way of securing a broader set of rights.
Furthermore, for a Technological Patron to be in the position to force such
concessions from content owners, the Technological Patron may need to be in
such a dominant position that an antitrust violation is likely. Put differently, the
type of leverage necessary to force an absolute digital first-sale right may, if
achieved, also mean that such a result is less likely, since the Technological
Patron may be more likely to abuse its dominant position in the opposite
direction. Part IV turns to these and related questions.
2.

Shared Accounts

The first-sale right is approximated via other permissions to which
Technological Patrons and content owners have contractually agreed. For
instance, consumers can often register their content accounts on multiple
devices. 112 That means that family members and others wishing to share access
to works can pool their titles and other creative works under one account, each
register their devices to that account, and thereby access each others' works.

This not only applies to e-books, but music, videos, and other creative works as
well. In some instances accounts need not even be shared. In such cases the
Technological Patron has simply secured the right of family
members to each
113
have access to the same content under separate accounts.
While this type of functionality is not a perfect substitute for a first-sale
right and certainly introduces some inconveniences, it nonetheless helps avoid
some of the harsher results of not having the right by allowing access to works
among groups of closely associated persons, most typically families.
3.

DigitalResale Marketplaces

Other technology companies have sought to facilitate digital resales by
establishing digital resale marketplaces that approximate the physical world as
much as possible and thereby address some of the concerns about digital
piracy. For instance, ReDigi, which launched in 2011, offers a service that

112. Authorize Your Device, Amazon.com, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeld=201379910 (last visited May 15, 2015) (detailing this feature with
respect to Amazon Music).
113. Family Sharing. Sharing with Your Family Comes Naturally. Now It Comes to All
Your Content, https://www.apple.com/ios/ios8/family-sharing/ (last visited May 15, 2015)
(detailing Apple's program that permits this).
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facilitates sales of used music files between customers. 1 14 The platform
includes technologies that verify that the files were legally purchased and
attempt to prevent the party selling the file from retaining a copy for
themselves. 115 Capitol Records sued ReDigi in 2013 and won the case, with the
court ruling that the first-sale doctrine did not shield ReDigi
from copyright
117
liability. 116 An attempt to appeal the decision was denied.
Despite this setback, ReDigi continues to operate and has refined its
technologies in a way that, it claims, makes its services legal. 118 In fact, the
company is planning to expand beyond music into e-books, software, and
audiobooks as well. 119 As of the date of this writing, no additional lawsuits
have been filed against ReDigi based on its updated services; one can buy and
sell used music files through the service today. Other more established
Technological Patrons, such as Amazon and Google, have filed for and
obtained patents covering the operation of digital resale markets. 120 While they
have not yet implemented these ideas, it may be only a matter of time before
they do.
Thus, despite the absence of an absolute digital first-sale right, several
Technological Patrons have either already sought to approximate its effect or
may do so in the near future, both through contractual efforts and litigation.
While additional legal challenges are nearly certain, the growing technological
nature of the world suggests that technology's dependence on content-and
vice-versa-will only grow. As a result, Technological Patrons' involvement in
facilitating a digital first-sale fight will almost certainly grow, too.
B. DigitalFair Use
Technological Patrons have been at the forefront of other technological
copyright questions as well. For instance, perhaps the most well-known
exception to copyright's set of exclusive rights is what is known as "fair use."
114. ReDigi Launches World's First Marketplace Jor Used Digital Music, WHAT
I'Fi? (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.whathifi.com/news/redigiReDigi-launches-worlds-firstmarketplace-used-digital -music.
115. Id.
116. See generally Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (2013).
117. Ben Sisario, A Setback Jor Resellers oJ Digital Products, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 1,
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/media/redigi-loses-suitover -reselling-of-digital-music.html? r=0.
118. ReDigi Frequently Asked Questions: Is ReDigi Legal, http: /newsroom.redigi.com/
faq/ (last visited May 15, 2015) (assuring users the current service is legal).
119. See, for instance, ReDigi's website homepage, which prominently features the
ability to buy and resell music,
software,
e-Books,
and audiobooks,
at
https://www.redigi.com/site/ (last visited May 15, 2015). However, as of the date of this
writing, only buying used music was possible on the site.
120. David Streitfeld, Imagining a Swap Meet Jor E-Books and Music, N.Y. TIMEs
(Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/technology/revolution-in-the-resale-ofdigital -books -and-music.html?pagewanted=all.

Winter 2015] COPYRIGHT'S TECHNOLOGICAL INTERDEPENDENCIES

219

This exception allows for certain limited uses of copyrighted works, despite
12 1
such uses technically infringing authors' exclusive rights under copyright.
Traditional categories that have qualified as fair use include using copyrighted
works for purposes
of criticism, news reporting, parody, teaching, scholarship,
122
and research.
Nonetheless, what constitutes "fair use" has always been a difficult
question to answer ex ante. The Copyright Act lists four non-exhaustive factors
that courts assess in determining whether some use of a work is a "fair use": the
purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the
amount of the copyrighted work used, and the use's effect on the market for or
value of the copyrighted work. 123 Courts often give most weight to the purpose
and character of the use factor-i.e., whether the use is "transformative" or
not-as well as the use's effect on the market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 124 But no one factor is dispositive. 12 5 Like any multi-factor balancing
test, then, knowing beforehand how a court will take the factors into account
when assessing any given use is often speculative at best. Indeed, some have
cited the 6porous nature of the fair use defense as one of the primary problems
12
with it.
With the rise of the Internet and the digitization of creative works,
questions regarding what constitutes "fair use" in the digital sphere have
abounded. Because the business models of many Technological Patrons
critically depend on uses of digital content that, without a defense of fair use,
may infringe copyright, Technological Patrons have been instrumental in
litigating claims and successfully establishing a variety of fair uses in the
digital sphere. The following sections detail a few of the more prominent
examples thereof.

121. U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
FAIR
USE,
FL-102
(June
2012),
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl102.html.
122. Id.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
124. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) ("The more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors."); 4 MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 [A] [4] (2005) (stating that
the fourth factor often "emerges as the most important, and indeed, central" factor in fair use
cases (citations omitted)). See generally Joel L. Hecker, The Wave of the Future or Blatant
Copyright Infringement? 79 N.Y. ST.B.J. 44 (2007) (indicating that courts have traditionally
given the most weight in a fair use analysis to the first and fourth factors).
125. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78 (indicating that no one factor is dispositive); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475-76 (1984) (same).
126. See, e.g., Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam))
(referring to the fair use doctrine as "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright.");
NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 66 (2008) (indicating that "[g]iven the
doctrine's open-ended, case-specific cast and inconsistent application, it is exceedingly
difficult to predict whether a given use in a given case will qualify" as fair use).
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1. Perfect ]0's Perfect Storm
In the well-known Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. case, Google
127
secured a victory in the Ninth Circuit relating to permitted digital fair uses.
Perfect 10 is an adult entertainment magazine that operates a subscription-only
website.128 A number of third parties had copied images of nude models from
Perfect 10's site and placed those images on various websites, in violation of
Perfect 10's terms of service and copyright rights. 129 Through Google and
Amazon's search technologies, users could access links to the third party sites
hosting the infringing images and, in the case of Google's image search, view
degraded thumbnail versions of130
the images without accessing the actual website
where the images were hosted.
Perfect 10 ultimately sued both Amazon.com, Inc. and Google for, among
other things, violation of their distribution and display rights under
copyright. 131 The District Court held that Google's provision of thumbnail
versions of the images violated Perfect 10's display rights under copyright
law. 132
Significantly for purposes of digital fair use, on appeal the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court, holding that Google's provision of the thumbnail
versions of the images constituted fair use.133 The court held that the use was
highly transformative in that the thumbnail versions indicated the source of
information rather than being used for expressive purposes; use of the images
in this different context was thus sufficient to satisfy the first factor of the fair
use analysis. 134 And though such images may hypothetically supplant Perfect
10's licensing of the images for mobile devices, the court found that the use
was so transformative as part of a search engine that the significant public
benefit thereof outweighed whatever commercial advantages Google may have
135
reaped therefrom.
The court weighted the second and third factors-the nature of the
copyrighted work and the amount used-only slightly in favor of Perfect 10.
Though the works were highly expressive and thus of the type that copyright
law was meant to protect, the court found that this factor only weighed slightly
in favor of Perfect 10 because the images were already found on the Internet
prior to Google displaying thumbnail versions of them. 136 Perfect 10 was thus

127. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
128. Id. at 1157.

129. Id. at 1154-56.
130. Id.
131.

Id. at 1157.

132. Id.
133. Id. at 1168.
134. Id. at 1165-66.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1167.
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not entitled to the enhanced copyright protection that comes with unpublished
works, though they remained entitled to some. 137 On the third fair use factor,
Google necessarily used the entirety of
the images, so the court deemed this
138
factor as neutral in the overall balance.
On the fourth factor-the use's effect on the market for or value of the
copyrighted work-the court found that the thumbnail versions did not harm
the market for the full-size images; thumbnail versions were no substitute for
the larger ones. 139 Furthermore, though market harn may be presumed if use of
the image is for commercial gain, that presumption does not arise in cases of
transformative use because market substitution is less certain. 14 And last,
though Perfect 10 has a licensing market for reduced-size images, there was no
finding that Google users had actually downloaded the thumbnail versions for
use on cell phones. 141 Consequently, the court found this hypothetical harn as
merely that.
In sum, Google's efforts to advance image search technology also resulted
in litigation that ultimately produced significant guidance on digital fair use.
That guidance suggests that at least some courts are amenable to permitting use
of copyrighted materials in new technological contexts that provide society
significant benefits. Google and other Technological Patrons' interests thus
lead them to not only provide patronage that facilitates increased production of
and access to a wider variety of creative materials, but also result in these
Patrons taking commercial risks to help establish the contours of significant
exceptions to copyright rights such as digital fair uses. And with such contours
more firnly established, innovators and creative persons alike are better
equipped to pursue new lines of creative and innovative activity.
2.

Google Books

Indeed, subsequent digital fair use cases have relied heavily on the
reasoning from Perfect 10, including litigation relating to the Google Books
project. In 2002 Google began its ambitious project of digitizing the world's
available literature. 142 It formed partnerships with many high-profile university
and public libraries in a laborious effort to digitize and then
make available via
143
search queries the libraries' tens of millions of book titles.
The Google Books project's precise scope has changed over time, but as
currently implemented, the service allows for searching the full text of the
137.

Id.

138. Id. at 1167-68.
139. Id. at 1168.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Google
Books
History,
GOOGLE
BOOKS,
http://www.google.com/googlebooks/about/history.html (last visited May 15, 2015).
143. Id.
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books that Google has digitized, with some exceptions.144 Once search results
appear, users can access and download the full text of works that are in the
public domain. 145 For other titles, the amount of text that appears
seems to
146
depend on what Google and the copyright holder have agreed to.
For instance, with some works, a preview of the work is available in the
form of multiple accessible pages, some of which include the search terns. 147
In such cases, Google and the copyright holder presumably have14 8reached some
sort of agreement to make such amounts available to the public.
In other cases, only small snippets of text surrounding the search terms are
available, presumably because the copyright holder and Google failed to agree
to additional permissions.149 Google Books also provides links to purchase the
searched books, both in hardcopy
form and e-Book format from the Google
150
Play store, when available.
Google's position all along has been that both digitizing the books and
making small snippets of them available via search queries constitutes fair
use. 15 1 While Google does copy the entire work in each case, which would
typically weigh against a finding of fair use, Google and others consider the
purpose and character of the copying to be highly "transformative," i.e., the
project allows users to search through as well as find books, which
functionality allows for a variety of uses beyond what the copyrighted works
are traditionally used for. 152 Furthermore, Google and others believe that this
type of transformative use fails to negatively affect the market for digitized
works-if anything, the Google Books project improves the market for
copyrighted works by allowing users to more readily find and purchase
them. 153
Nonetheless, Google's initiation of the project brought immediate reaction
from major publishing houses as well as other copyright holders and
organizations associated with them. In short, these parties claim that Google
did not obtain pennission to create digital copies of their works and thus
violated their rights under copyright. 154 They also contend that the doctrine of
144. How

Google

Books

Works,

GOOGLE

BOOKS,

https://support.google.com/

books /answer/43724?hl =en (last visited May 15, 2015).
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Perspectives: Legal Analysis, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://www.google.com/
googlebooks/perspectives/legal.htmi (last visited May 15, 2015).
152. Id.
153. Id.

154. See Letter from Peter Givler, Executive Director, AAUP, to Alexander
Macgillivray, Senior Intellectual Property and Product Counsel at Google, Inc., available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2005-05-22/the-university-press-assn-dot-s-
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fair use does not apply to Google's use of their works. 155 Many of these same
parties filed lawsuits
in 2005 against Google, some of which suits are still
156
ongoing today.
Others have already chronicled the exodus of these lawsuits, including
class certification issues that arose during the litigation and the proposed and
ultimately rejected settlements of the litigation. 157 The purpose here is not to
repeat in detail that helpful work. Instead, it is to highlight the role that Google
has played with the Google Books project and the subsequent litigation in
helping to further define what constitutes digital fair use. Indeed, the ultimate
resolution of these issues provides additional evidence of the interdependencies
between technology and copyright as well as more precisely delineating how
they may work together going forward.
Naturally, Google has its own interests in pursuing the project; it must have
some strategic commercial sense for the company. Otherwise, it would not
assume the significant costs and risks associated with the project. Be that as it
may, Google's pursuit of its own interests in this case promises to help society
generally by creating158
information about the scope of digital fair use upon which
others can then rely.
Google, in fact, has already secured significant legal victories in its
campaign to win a fair use ruling. Once the district court over the litigation
rejected the parties' multiple proposed settlements, Google's fair use arguments
again took center stage. On November 14, 2013, U.S. Circuit Judge Denny
Chin in Manhattan accepted Google's argument that digitizing millions of
books and then making snippets of the text available online via search queries
constituted fair use. 159
Importantly, the court sided with Google in concluding that Google's use
160
was transformative in nature by giving the books a new purpose or character.
And, it cited the Perfect 10 case in coming to this conclusion. 161 The first
factor in the fair use equation thus weighed heavily in favor of Google. The
court also reasoned that the project could be expected to boost rather than

objections.
155. Id.

156. Complaint, Author's Guild v. Google, 954 F. Supp 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No.
05 Civ. 8136).
157. See generally, e.g., James Grimmelman, Future Conduct and the Limits of ClassAction Settlements, 91 N.C. L. REv. 387 (2013); James Grimmelman, The Elephantine
Google Books Settlement, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 497 (2011). See also Linford,
surpa note 6.
158. For an argument that IP law should potentially expand to protect this type of
information in order to reward the investments made by parties such as Google, see Michael
Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, IntellectualPropertyJor Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 337 (2008).
159. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
160. Id. at 291-92.

161. Id.
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undermine book sales. 162 Hence, the other most significant factor in the fair use
test, i.e., the use's economic effect, also, according to the court, went in
Google's favor. Overall, the court held that the project provides society
significant benefits while maintaining "respectful consideration" for authors'
rights, despite the fact the Google copied highly expressive works in their
entirety.163
While several layers of appeal are possible-and the plaintiffs have already
filed an appeal with the Second Circuit 164-the district court ruling nonetheless
provides some interim clarification of what constitutes fair use in the digital
sphere, at least in one major circuit: namely, that digitizing entire copyrighted
works and then putting them to new, highly beneficial uses without negatively
affecting the author's market for the works constitutes fair use.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit recently provided significant clues about
how it may handle the plaintiffs' appeal. In June 2014, the Second Circuit in
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust upheld a district court ruling that HathiTrust's
digitization of millions of copyrighted works into a full-text searchable
database constitutes fair use of the copyrighted works.165 The HathiTrust was
founded in 2008 as an offshoot of the Google Books project. 166 It is a
partnership of many major academic research libraries and includes digital
materials from the Google Books project as well as from the Internet Archive,
Microsoft, and in-house partner institutions. 167
Unlike the Google Books project, however, for most users the HathiTrust
Digital Library ("HDL") does not display actual text from books in response to
search queries. Instead, when most users search for terms in the HDL, results
appear simply as page numbers of the book in which the terms appear. 168
In applying the four fair use factors in this case, the court ruled that
creation of a full-text searchable database is a "quintessentially transformative
use" because the result of a term search differs in "purpose, character,
expression, meaning, and message from the page (and the book) from which it
is drawn." 16 9 Again, the court cited the Perfect 10 case in coming to its
conclusion. 170 And though the nature of the copyrighted work-the second
factor in the fair use analysis-might technically weigh in favor of the
162. Id.at 292-93.
163. Id.at 293.

164. Nicholas Tomsho, Authors Guild Files Appeal in Google Copyright Claim, JuRIST
(Apr. 12, 2014, 11:30 AM ET), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/04/authors-guild-filesappeal -on-copyright-claim-against -google.php.
165. 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).
166. Id. at 90.
167. Id.

168. Id. at 91. For those with certified print disabilities-or any disability that prevents
a person from effectively reading printed material- the HDL does provides access to the full
text of copyrighted works.
169. Id. at 97.

170. Id.
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plaintiffs, that factor is not dispositive, according to the court, particularly
in
17 1
cases where the use is highly transformative, as is the case with the HDL.
The court ruled that the last two factors of the fair use test-the amount
used and the economic effect-also weighed in favor of HathiTrust. First,
copying the entire contents of each book was necessary in order to enable
HathiTrust's transformative use of the works. 172 And second, the court
reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate17 3that the HDL acts as a
substitute in the marketplace for the original works.
Of course, the Second Circuit may rule differently in Authors Guild v.
Google, Inc. because the search queries in the Google Books project do result
in retrieval of snippets of text from the books in certain cases. Nonetheless, it
would seem to require some mental gymnastics for the Second Circuit to come
to a different conclusion in that case while remaining consistent with its ruling
in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust.
After all, the Google Books project is still in all important respects the
same as the HDL-namely, a searchable full-text database of copyrighted
works-and thus the analysis relating to the first factor of the fair use equation
should be the same: the use is highly transformative. The second and third
factors of the fair use test relating to the nature of the copyrighted work and the
amount used should also play out no differently. That is, while copyright law is
meant to protect the types of works copied, the fact that the use is highly
transformative should outweigh this factor as it did in the HathiTrustcase. And,
as in the HathiTrust case, Google necessarily copied the entire contents of each
title in order to produce the searchable database.
The text retrieval element of the Google Books project should only affect
the fourth factor of fair use, if any, i.e., the economic effect of the use on the
market for or value of the copyrighted works. But it seems unlikely that the
Second Circuit will rule that the snippets that Google displays actually
substitute for the original works-most obviously because they do not.
Presumably, then, the result will be the same on this factor in both cases, and
the overall result will be, too.
Given the highly unpredictable nature of litigation, it is of course possible
that the Second Circuit could come to a different conclusion on the basis of
these or other differences between the two databases. Furthermore, even
assuming a Google victory in the Second Circuit, other circuits, as well as the
Supreme Court, would have to weigh in before additional certainty could be
obtained. Nonetheless, for those that support the Google Books project and the
legal outcomes thus far, there is certainly reason for optimism.
In sum, Google's pursuit of the Google Books project promises to provide
significant benefits to society, to some extent regardless of the litigation's
171.

Id. at 98.

172. Id. at 98-99.
173. Id. at 90-101.
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outcome. While this form of Technological Patronage may align with Google' s
strategic commercial vision, it should also ultimately provide society with
significant information about the scope of digital fair use as well as, potentially,
greater access to and information about the works themselves. The final rulings
relating to fair use should thus help facilitate greater creative and innovative
activities by creating greater certainty about what is permissible in the
interrelationship between technology and copyright.
Of course, the opposite may also be true. If the ultimate fair use rulings
were so broad that they undermined copyright owners' ability to obtain
economic rewards for their works, they may have the effect of dampening the
economic incentives upon which copyright law is predicated. But if one
believes the courts' and others' reasoning about the economic impact of
Google's and others' digitization of copyrighted works on the original worksand there seems to be good reasons to do so-then such Technological
Patronage may instead enhance copyright holders' fortunes rather than
diminish them.
Hence, the Google Books project and resulting litigation are further
evidence of the interdependencies between Technological Patronage and
copyright in a broader creative system. The institution of copyright helps
generate creative works, which in turn trigger technological innovation aimed
at making greater use of those works, which then facilitates such uses in ways
that promote additional creative and innovative activity. And the cycle goes on.
Though it may not always be virtuous, it nonetheless contradicts the opposing
view that either copyright or technology is the key to creative output. In today' s
world, they both are.
C. Software's Copyright Problem
Technological Patrons have also recently been at the forefront of helping
solve some of the biggest questions regarding software's copyrightability. In
general, software is subject to copyright protection in the U.S. 17 4 Congress,
courts, and even international treaties all mandate as much. 17 5 At the same
time, copyright is only meant to extend to the expression of ideas, not the
underlying ideas themselves. Indeed, the U.S. Copyright Act expressly
174. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2014) (defining a computer program as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result."). Computer programming is not specifically enumerated as subject to copyright
protection in the Copyright Act, as many other categories of works are, but according to
some courts it is implicitly included as a literary work. See Computer Assocs. Int'l., Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2nd Cir. 1992) (indicating that "[w]hile computer programs
are not specifically listed as part of the... statutory definition, the legislative history leaves
no doubt that Congress intended them to be considered literary works." (citations omitted));
see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2014).
175. Id.; Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art.
10(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81
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excludes from copyright protection any "idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the forn in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied."' 176 It's traditionally
left to patent law to protect these categories to the extent that they meet the
requirements of the Patent Act.
Because software is by definition functional-in general it can be
described as a series of instructions to bring about some result-it has proven
difficult for courts to precisely delineate which aspects of software deserve
copyright protection as original and creative expressions of the underlying idea,
and which aspects fall within the categories mentioned above, for which
Congress has expressly foreclosed copyright protection, and for which patent
protection may be more appropriate.
One of the more significant questions about software copyrightability is
whether application programming interfaces ("APIs") are subject to
copyright. 177 In general, APIs are a set of software tools and instructions meant
to help software developers build software programs that work within the
technological environment for which the APIs were created. 17 8 In other words,
APIs enable distinct software programs to effectively communicate and
exchange information with each other. For instance, APIs enable a host of
useful things that most take for granted: logging into a website using one's
Facebook credentials; cutting and pasting between distinct software programs;
using non-Microsoft programs on devices powered by Microsoft Windows;
obtaining Google Maps results on Yelp; and the list goes on. APIs thus allow
for interoperability between software programs by allowing them to work
together. And they are increasingly crucial in a digital ecosystem in order to
enable interactions
between heterogeneous platforms and thereby unlock latent
9
17

value.

In some respects, APIs would seem to be exempt from copyright
protection. After all, at some level they can clearly be described as a system,
method of operation, or procedure. To illustrate with a simplistic example: in
order for Developer A's program to operate with and effectively exchange
information with Developer B's program, Developer B's APIs dictate the

176. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2014).
177. See Pamela Samuelson, The Strange Odyssey of Software InterJaces and
Intellectual
Property
Law
(2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1323818 (tracing the evolution of how APIs have and have not
been protected under IP law). See generally John Harilee, The Protectionof the Unpublished
Application Protocol Interface Under Copyright Law, 4 VA. J. L. & TECH. 6 (1999)
(addressing this question over a decade ago).
178. See generally Brian Proffitt, What APIs Are and Why They're Important,
READWRITE (Sept. 19, 2013), http://readwrite.com/2013/09/19/api-defined (describing how
APIs work).
179. Vinod Baya & Ted Shelton, Interview with Sam Ramji, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER,
http://www.pwc.com/us/en technology-forecast/2012/issue2/interviews/interview-sam-ramjiapigee.jhtml (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
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parameters for doing so. Developer A must follow specific procedures in order
for Developer A's program to interoperate with Developer B's program;
generally the APIs will dictate that certain source code headers-one might
view them as tokens or keys-be used in order to successfully trigger certain
functions from and compatibilities with Developer B's program. As such, it is
difficult to describe APIs as anything other than a system, method of operation,
or procedure that the API originator has developed in order to allow others to
create programs that interoperate with their own.
Indeed, some courts have appeared to follow this logic. For instance, in an
important Ninth Circuit case, Sega Enterprises v. Accolade Inc., the court
indicates that the interface specifications -or parts of the APIs-of the Sega
game console were unprotectable elements of the copyrighted software
because, even if they were expressive in some measure, they were necessary to
use in order to realize compatibility with the Sega game console. 180 Thus,
Accolade maintained a successful fair use defense to its copying and
decompiling of Sega's entire game console software in order to obtain access to
the non-protectable
pieces of the APIs and therewith create Sega-compatible
18 1
games.
But does that mean third parties can replicate the APIs for their own
purposes? In other words, if a party uses the APIs not in order to create a
compatible software program, but instead to augment their own APIs and
software programs, does the result change? Or should these questions even
matter? After all, if the APIs are uncopyrightable and some other form of
protection, such as a patent, does not apply, then third parties should be able to
use them as they will. This and other related questions are the focus of one of
the most important software copyright decisions issued to date, as discussed
more fully below.
1. Android's Java Problem
Google's Android software has become the world's most popular software
platform for mobile devices, including smartphones, tablets, gaming consoles,
and others. 182 Google licenses Android under a variety of permissive open
source software licenses that make it accessible to parties other than just
Google. 183 It thus powers devices from a variety of companies, including LG,
Samsung, Amazon, Motorola, and many others. 184 As of November 11, 2013,

180. 977 F.2d 1510, 1524-26 (9th Cir. 1992).
181. Id.
182. Steven Levy, New Android Boss Finally Reveals PlansJor World's Most Popular
Mobile OS, WIRED (May 13, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/05/exclusivesundar -pichai -reveals -his -plans -for-android.
183. Licenses, ANDROID, https://source.android.com/source/licenses.html (last visited
Jan. 25, 2015).
184. Lisa Mahapatra, Android Vs. iOS: What's the Most Popular Mobile Operating
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Android was used on 43% of the world's smartphones,
making it by far the
185
most popular mobile software platform in the world.
Part of Android's ubiquity and usefulness stems from its incorporation of
Java APIs. Sun Microsystems originally developed the Java APIs; Oracle
Corporation subsequently acquired Sun Microsystems and thus ownership of
the Java APIs. 186 Sun developed the APIs to help programmers solve a
ubiquitous problem: having to create a new version of a software program for
every different technology platforn in order for the program to operate
properly on each. 187 The Java APIs helped solve this problem by enabling
software developers to create programs once
that could then operate on any
188
number of different technological platforms.
When building Android, Google elected to copy many aspects of the Java
APIs into the Android ecosystem. Google did so largely because programmers
were already familiar with many of the functionalities that the Java APIs
permitted. Thus, Google decided to incorporate many of the same
functionalities into Android so that programmers would have an easier time
working with and adopting Android. 189
Google thus copied the basic structure, sequence, and organization of 37
specific Java APIs into the Android platforn. 190 In some cases Google also
copied from the Java APIs single words or short lines of software source code.
Google copied this "declaring code" into Android because, without doing so,
the pertinent Java API would not work as intended. 19 1 Google also copied
entire files of source code in several instances. 192 But in nearly all other cases,
Google created its own "implementing code," the software that actually
carries
193
out the functions specified by the declaring code within the Java APIs.
Oracle ultimately brought copyright infringement claims against Google on
the basis of Google's use of the Java APIs within Android. 194 Google answered
System In Your Country, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TiMEs (Nov. 11, 2013, 3:22 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/android-vs-ios-whats-most-poptlar-mobile-operating-system-yourcountry- 1464892.
185. Id.
186. Larry Dignan, Oracle Buys Sun; Now Owns Java; Becomes a Hardware Player,
ZDNET (Apr. 20, 2009, 4:44 PM GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/oracle-buys-sunnow -owns -java-becomes -a-hardware-player/ 16598.
187. See generally History of the JavaM Programming Language, WIKIBOOKS,
http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Java Programming/History (last modified Jan. 20, 2015).
188. Id.
189. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
190. Id. at 977-79.

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. The original suit also included patent infringement claims. See Oracle Sues
Google
Over
Android,
REUTERS
(Aug.
13,
2010,
2:23
AM
EDT),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/13/us -google-oracle-android-lawsuitidUKTRE67B5G720100813. But Oracle ultimately lost on the patent claims. Oracle, 872 F.
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the suit by, among other things, arguing that the APIs were not subject to
copyright and, even if they were, Google's use of them constituted fair use. 195
In a highly anticipated decision, the district court found that the basic structure,
sequence, and organization of the APIs were not copyrightable because they
were a system or method of operation, 196 which the Copyright
Act expressly
197
excludes from copyright protection, as described above.
The district court also found that copying the declaring code could not
constitute copyright infringement because the merger and short phrase
doctrines under copyright law barred copyright for that specific code. 198 That
is, copyright generally only protects the expression of an idea, not the idea
itself. And when only one or a limited number of ways exist to express a
particular idea, the idea is said to merge with the expression, whereby copyright
199
protection ceases for that expression.
Furthermore, copyright generally does
200
phrases.
short
or
names
protect
not
The district court reasoned that because only one way exists to express the
declaring code in order for it to operate as intended, the idea behind it merges
with the expression, and copyright protection is thereby foreclosed.20 1
Furthermore, because the declaring code is in each instance typically a single
word or short line of software code, the short phrase2 doctrine
also prevented the
2
0
protection.
copyright
obtaining
from
code
declaring
Finally, because the district court deemed that the Java APIs were not
subject to copyright-or at least the parts of the APIs that Google copied-it
found no need to order a new trial on the issue of fair use. 2 0 3 The original jury
had failed 4to resolve the issue, resulting in a "hung jury" on the fair use
2
question. 0
Oracle appealed the district court's decision, which normally would have
gone to the Ninth Circuit. 2 0 5 But because the original suit included assertions of
patent infringement, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has

Supp. 2d at 976. ("In phase two, the jury found no patent infringement across the board.")
195. Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 975-76.
196. Id. at 976-77.
197. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2014).
198. Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 996-98.
199. Id.
200. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2015).
201. Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 996-98.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1001-02.
204. Rachel King, Oracle v. Google Jury Returns Partial Verdict, Favoring Oracle,
CNET (May 7, 2012, 11:30 AM PDT), http://www.cnet.com/news/oracle-v-google-juryreturns -partial -verdict-favoring-oracle.
205. See Anthony J. Dreyer et al., Federal Circuit Overturns Oracle v. Google and
Potentially Widens Debate Over Copyright Protections, SKADDEN, n. 1 (May 15, 2014),
http://www.skadden.com/insights/federal-circuit-overturns-emoracle-v-googleem-andpotentially-widens -debate-over -copyright-#topftnl.
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nationwide jurisdiction over appeals involving patent assertions, heard the
appeal. 20 6
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court on nearly every important
point. First, it emphatically held that the declaring code is subject to copyright
because Oracle had infinite options as to the selection and arrangement of the
thousands of lines of software that Google, in the cumulative, copied.20 7
Furthermore, the court held that the short phrase doctrine does not bar
copyright in this instance because the 7,000 lines of declaring code that Google
copied should be viewed in the cumulative rather than as individual lines or
20 8
words.
The Federal Circuit also concluded that the general structure, sequence,
and organization of the Java APIs were subject to copyright. The Federal
Circuit found that the district court failed to follow binding Ninth Circuit
precedent- which, according to it, holds that copyright can protect the
expression of a process or method-and instead followed precedent from
another circuit. 2 0 9 Furthermore, even the precedent upon which the district
court relied was distinguishable from the facts in the present case. 2 1 0 The
Federal Circuit thus concluded that because Oracle employed creative choices
in expressing the ideas underlying the Java APIs, that original work was subject
to copyright protection, despite whatever functional elements it entailed.21 1
On the fair use question, the Federal Circuit remanded the case for a new
trial on the issue. Although in its review of the fair use factors the court seemed
to side with Oracle's position that Google's use of the APIs was not fair use,
the court concluded that enough material facts were still in dispute that it could
2 12
not decide the issue.
2.

An Analysis

This landmark decision has spawned significant controversy in the
technology industry, with some arguing that the decision could prove disastrous
for software innovation, 2 1 3 while others believe the court came to exactly the
correct conclusions. 2 14 Google, of course, has a number of options. It could
206.

Id.

207. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
208. Id. at 1362-63.
209. Id. at 1365-68.
210. Id.
211.

Id. at 1367.

212. Id. at 1376-77.

213. Russell Brandon, Federal Court Overturns Google v. Oracle Decision, Setting
Disastrous
Precedent,
THE
VERGE
(May
9,
2014,
1:53
http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/9/5699958/federal-court-overturns-google-v-oracle.

PM),

214. Florian Mueller, Oracle Wins Android-Java Copyright Appeal: API Code
Copyrightable, New Trial on Fair Use, FOSS PATENTS (May 9, 2014),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/05/oracle-wins-android-java-copyright.html

(largely
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request an en banc review of the decision with the Federal Circuit, though the
tenor of the original decision from the panel may suggest doing so will be
futile. 2 15 It could
also seek a decision from the Supreme Court, which it has
2 16
recently done.

If the Supreme Court were to deny its petition for a writ of certiorari, then a
new trial on the fair use question would occur unless Google were to pursue en
banc review at the Federal Circuit. Based at least on the Federal Circuit's
opinion, Google's chances to prevail on the fair use issue appear unpromising.
Generally, the Federal Circuit's decision reflects an expansive view of
software copyrightability. 2 17 Essentially, the court suggests that so long as the
software developer had some choices as to how to structure and design the
APIs, the APIs are entitled to copyright protection. That is not a high threshold,
and admittedly copyright law generally does not require much before a work
becomes subject to copyright.
Part of what seems to underlie the court's reasoning is that Google did not
copy the Java APIs in order to make them interoperable with Oracle's Java
platform, but instead used them in order to create their own, potentially
competing system that in fact is not compatible with Oracle's Java platform.
Hence, the Federal Circuit calls Google's compatibility arguments confusing
and points to evidence presented at the district court level indicating that
Google adopted the Java APIs in order to make adoption by programmers more
2 18
seamless.
Of course, Google's compatibility argument is more nuanced than that;
part of its rationale in adopting Java APIs is because developers that have
written programs using Java can then use those programs within Android
without having to completely rework the program. But the court dismissed this
argument summarily, indicating that it had no evidence proving this point and
that, in any event, the copyrightability
of Oracle's software does not rest on
2 19
Google's compatibility needs.
One key, unresolved issue stemming from this decision, therefore, is what
role does interoperability play in the software copyrightability analysis? The
Federal Circuit suggests it is to be considered at the time of creation of the
software only; that is, if interoperability concerns dictated a software
developer's creative choices in designing the software, then those aspects of the

applauding the ruling).
215. Id. (suggesting that a full-court review would probably not change the outcome).
216. Jonathan Band, Supreme Court Reviews Google v. Oracle Petition;Interoperability
Ruling Under Scrutiny, Disruptive Competition Project (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.projectdisco.org/competition/010915-supreme-court-reviews-google-v -oracle-petition/.
217. See Dreyer, supra note 205; Pamela Samuelson, Guest Post: Are APIs Patent or
Copyright Subject Matter, PATENTLYO
(May 12, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/
patent/2014/05/copyright -subject-matter.html.
218. Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1371.
219. Id.
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work so dictated may not be copyrightable. 22 Interoperability
concerns of third
22 1
parties only become relevant, if at all, in a fair use analysis.
But though the Federal Circuit purports to be applying Ninth Circuit law in
so holding, several Ninth Circuit cases as well as cases from other circuits
suggest that interoperability plays out differently in the software
copyrightability analysis. Sega, for instance, may be interpreted to support the
proposition that APIs absent the implementing code, to the extent their use is
necessary in order to enable interoperability, are exempt from copyright
protection
as functional elements of the software. 222 Other courts seem to
3
22

agree.

Of course, in Google's case, the Java APIs were used not to ensure
compatibility with Oracle's Java Platform specifically, but rather with software
programs that others write using the Java programming language and Java
APIs. Whether that specific difference entails a different result is yet to be
determined. But the policy behind allowing for interoperability in spite of
copyright -namely, in order to encourage greater competition, innovation, and
creative activity-would seem to apply in Google's case as well.
Indeed, if Google's case ultimately becomes a decision of fair use,
arguments in favor of fair use are not altogether without merit, despite the
Federal Circuit taking a rather grim view of their prospects. On the first
factor-the purpose and character of the use, including whether the use is for
commercial or nonprofit purposes -Google can make a case that what it has
done with the Java APIs supersedes anything that Oracle has been able to
achieve with them. Oracle has never successfully implemented the Java APIs as
part of smartphone software platform. 224 Google has, and completely rewrote
the implementing software code for the platform, as well as augmenting the 37
Java APIs with hundreds more of its own. Google will face challenges in
winning this point, since in some nominal sense it has simply used the APIs in
the manner for which they were originally intended-that is, as APIs. But
Google has arguably put them into a completely different context and helped
transform the smartphone and mobile computing industry by doing so. Thus,
though the use is certainly commercial in nature, if one accepts the view that
the use of the APIs is highly transformative, the commercial aspect alone
should not prove dispositive.
On the second factor-the nature of the copyrighted work-software is by
nature utilitarian, and so logically more aspects of it should be found
functional, and therefore uncopyrightable, than other types of creative works.
220.

Id.

Id. at 1371-72.
222. Salnuelson, supra note 217.
221.

223.

Id.

224. Larry Dignan, Google: Oracle, Sun, Blew It On a Java Smartphone, CNET (Apr.
18, 2012, 5:46 AM PDT), http://www.cnet.com/news/google-oracle-sun-blew-it-on-a-javasmartphone.
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Indeed, such a proposition finds support in the Sony and Sega cases mentioned
above. And particularly in a case where a party such as Google copies aspects
of the Java APIs primarily in order to replicate the categories of functions that
the APIs provide for and which many in the industry expect-all the while
undertaking the significant effort to write the code that actually implements the
function itself -this factor would seem to support Google's position.
On the third factor of the fair use analysis-the amount of the copyrighted
work used-some of this analysis depends on how it is framed. For instance,
Google only used 37 of hundreds of available Java APIs. But viewing the issue
from a different angle, if each of the APIs is viewed as a separate work, then
Google copied 37 separate works in their entirety. Of course, this is not how the
Federal Circuit viewed the APIs-they viewed them in the cumulative,
including the declaring code, in coming to the conclusion that the work
included significant expressive choice. Overall, then, Google seemed to only
use that number of the Java APIs that it deemed were essential for software
developers accustomed to Java to have.
The final factor-the use's effect on the market for or value of the
copyrighted work-may be the most difficult obstacle to Google winning a fair
use argument. Before Oracle acquired Sun, the company had a long history of
licensing the APIs; indeed, licensing APIs is not uncommon in the world of
technology. Of course, it seems questionable to foreclose a finding of fair use
simply because a party is willing to license assets and others are willing to pay,
though some courts have engaged in such circular reasoning. 225 Indeed, riskaverse parties may regularly pay for things that the law may not actually
require of them. 226 For instance, a prominent engineer at Google notoriously
indicated in the run-up to the Oracle v. Google decision that he was under the
impression that the company would need to license the APIs from Sun
Microsystems, and Google in fact engaged in extensive negotiations with Sun
Microsystems to license the APIs, though they never reached a deal. 227
While all of this may seem damning for Google's fair use case, the
question nonetheless remains what the market impact of Google's use was.
Oracle clearly lost some revenues from the lost licensing opportunity to
Google. But Oracle has never successfully developed a smartphone/tablet
225. See generally Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
(rejecting Texaco's fair use argument, largely on the basis that copying individual journal
articles hurt the licensing market for the individual articles even though, at the time, the
market was not well-developed).
226. See generally James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
PropertyLaw, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (arguing generally that risk aversion may lead to an
expansion of intellectual property lights, or at least how parties and courts perceive the scope
of intellectual property rights).
227. Brandon Bailey, Larry Page Evasive With Oracle's Lawyer, But Admits Google
Never Obtained Java License, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 18, 2012, 9:55:02 AM PDT),
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci 20424638/google-oracle-trial-larry-page-admits-androidjava-licence (detailing some of the history of the negotiations between the two sides).
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software platform using its Java APIs, nor has it successfully licensed anyone
else to do so. So Google's use of the APIs in such a platforn does not appear to
undercut any revenues that Oracle expects. 22 8 True, Oracle is free to continue
to try do create such a platform or license someone else to do so.. But
preventing Google from using the APIs, on the mere supposition that Oracle
may eventually do so, or may eventually successfully license someone else to
do so, seems like the wrong result.
In fact, in some respects Google's use of the Java APIs may actually
enhance Oracle's market for the Java APIs. Because Google incorporated the
APIs into its own platform, software developers that use Java now need not
switch APIs. While Google's use of the APIs may not be the only factor in
encouraging developers to continue to use Java, it may be a significant one.
Android's incorporation of Java APIs may thus actually bolster Java as an
industry standard, which in the future may mean that third parties are more
likely to use Oracle's Java-related products for other purposes for which Oracle
actually provides technological solutions.
3.

Conclusion

In sum, many unanswered questions remain following the Federal Circuit's
decision in Oracle v. Android. Many feel that the court reversed decades of
well-settled law that allowed for use of functional aspects of works in order to
permit interoperability. 22 9 And yet others feel that the court's decision helps
protect valuable business assets, which, in the end, should help promote
innovation.
Though the final result will certainly have significant effects on creativity
and innovation in various industries, the larger point for purposes of this Article
is to highlight the role that Google and others play in helping address some of
the more contentious issues in copyright law today. In other words, while the
specific results matter, the meta-result- that is, having additional guidance at
all-is also crucial in enabling other parties to take into account risks in
pursuing creative and innovative activities. Technological Patrons such as
Google thus take on significant financial risks in pursuing activities that,
because of interdependencies between technology and copyright, implicate
vital copyright questions, with respect to both software and other digital
content. They therefore not only provide significant patronage that facilitates
creative activity directly, but also ultimately help resolve the meaning of the
law itself, which in the end also facilitates creative as well as innovative
228. Larry Dignan, Google: Oracle, Sun Failed at Java Smartphone Now Stop
Whining, ZDNet (Apr. 18, 2012, 05:22 GMT), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/google-oraclesum-failed-at-java-smartphone-now-stop-whining/74561
(highlighting Google's evidence
that Sum/Oracle had tried but failed multiple times to develop a Java-based software platform
for smarthphones).
229. See Samuelson, supra note 217.
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activities.
IV.

TECHNOLOGICAL PATRONAGE'S DARK SIDE

This Article has thus far explored the significant ways in which
Technological Patrons such as Google, Amazon, and others facilitate creative
activity by both (1) contributing tools and content to society that lead to
increased production of and access to a more diverse set of creative works, and
(2) helping resolve some of the thornier issues in copyright law by means of
both contractual arrangements and litigation. In so doing, Technological
Patrons aid copyright in achieving its constitutional purpose. And, of course,
Technological Patrons provide such support in part due to copyright and the
commercial possibilities associated with it. Technology and copyright are thus
increasingly dependent on each other, particularly as the world grows
increasingly technological.
But Technological Patronage may also come with its set of warts. Though
more and more companies have concluded that openness and collaboration are
often a successful business strategy, they certainly do not always follow that
mantra. Particularly in cases where Technological Patrons have significant
market position, they may use that position to pursue what they perceive as
their commercial interests at the expense of other considerations. In such cases,
one casualty can be the purposes behind copyright, in which cases the synergies
between copyright and Technological Patronage explored above may break
down.
But, as this section will argue, the remedy to such ills is not in general to
bolster copyright. The ill to be corrected in many such cases is market
concentration, not an excessively weak copyright. And the natural antidote to
excessive market concentration is antitrust law, not copyright law.
This Part will first review some of the more recent situations where
Technological Patrons have used their superior market positions to jeopardize
access to and production of creative works. It will also explore why antitrust
law is the appropriate, even if not always effective, means of addressing these
types of scenarios.
A. Amazon's Hachette Job
Amazon is a dominant player in the world of e-Books and e-Readers.
Though the company does not publicly reveal sales figures, a variety of sources
suggest it is the clear leader and is poised to remain so, despite
significant
2 30
challenges from the likes of Apple, Barnes & Noble, and Google.

230. See Jeremy Greenfield, Kindle Most Popular Device Jor Ebooks, Beating Out
iPad;
Tablets
on
the
Rise,
FORBES
(Oct.
30,
2013,
4:26
PM),
http: //www.forbes.com/sites/jeremygreenfield/2013 /10 /30/kindle-most-popular-device-for-
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Amazon at times has used this market position to the advantage of
consumers. For instance, historically Amazon retained the contractual ability to
set retail prices for the e-Books it sold, and it accordingly in many cases sold
2 31
books at prices below the wholesale prices that it paid the copyright owners.
Copyright owners naturally disliked this arrangement, since in their view such
lower prices tended to devalue books generally. 2 3 2 Nonetheless, publishing
houses were at a disadvantage in changing it given Amazon's superior market
position. Amazon was forced to change this pricing scheme once Apple joined
the e-Book fray and agreed to allow publishing houses to set the retail prices,
though Apple later came under antitrust scrutiny itself for alleged price fixing
2 33
with the publishing houses.
But Amazon has also used its superior market position in ways that
arguably harn access to and production of creative works. For instance, more
recently the company restricted access to and eliminated discounts on offerings
from a major publishing house, Hachette, over a purported contractual
dispute. 2 3 4 In such cases, the synergies between copyright and Technological
Patronage may appear to break down.
But in reality, the problem, to the extent that one exists, lies in market
concentration rather than having anything intrinsically to do with the
relationship between Technological Patronage and copyright in yielding
increased creative and innovative activity. In seeking to renegotiate its
contracts with Hatchette and others, for instance, Amazon does not appear to be
exploiting weak rights under copyright. Instead, its leverage is based in its
dominant position in the world of e-Books. The most appropriate body of law
for such issues is thus antitrust law, not copyright law.
Of course, even if antitrust law were to provide a solution, such solutions
may come with a cost. After all, the market sway that Amazon and others have

ebooks-beating-out-ipad-tablets-on-the-rise/ (indicating 40% of people that read e-Books
own an Amazon Kindle dedicated e-Reader); Aaron Pressman, Slowing Ebook Sales May
Embolden Publishers in Amazon Spat, YAHOO! FINANCE (June 26, 2014, 4:28 PM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/slowing-ebook-sales-could-hurt-amazon-in-battlewith-publishers-174752232.html (indicating Amazon is in the lead in the e-Book market and
may be still gaining).

231. What Is the Agency Model Jor Ebooks? Your Burning Questions Answered,
PUBLISHING
TRENDSETTER
(May
1,
2012),
http://publishingtrendsetter.com/
industryinsight/simple-explanation-agency-model/ (summarizing the differences between the
so-called agency model in which the book publisher sets the retailer price and remits 30% of
the sale to Amazon; and the wholesale model in which the book publisher sells the book to
the retailer at a specified price, and the retailer is able to set the retail price, at its discretion).
232. Id. See also Rupert Murdoch: "Amazon Pricing Devalues Books", REUTERS (Feb.
3, 2010, 10:15 AM), available at http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/355255/rupert-murdochamazon-pricing-devalues -books.

233. Rupert Murdoch, supranote 232.
234. Emma Cueto, Amazon vs. Hatchette: Everything You Need to Know About This
Feud, BUSTLE, http://www.bustle.com/articles/26570-amazon-vs-hachette-everything-youneed-to-know -about- this -feud (last accessed May 15, 2014).
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can lead to significant consumer benefits such as, for instance, quasi-digital
first-sale rights and lower prices. Be that as it may, the question nonetheless
seems to be most properly handled as a matter of antitrust law, rather than as a
copyright issue, since the issue largely relates to potential market imbalances.
B.

YouTube's Indie Label Doomsday

As noted, YouTube has become one of the most popular ways in the world
to access music and video. The site now partners with major record labels and
other content owners to host a significant amount of music and video content
that users often have been able to access for free.
But YouTube has begun to change its services in response to competitive
pressures. Online streaming music services such as Pandora and Spotify have
increased competition in the field, offering a variety of enhanced music
streaming capabilities that have lured many consumers to their services.
Accordingly, YouTube has begun to offer new services meant to compete with
the offerings of these and other companies.
For instance, in 2013 Google launched the "Google Play Music All
Access" subscription service that allows those paying a monthly fee to access
music on demand, ad-free. 235 And more recently, Google announced that it will
introduce a subscription-based streaming music service on YouTube236that may
work in conjunction with the Google Play Music All Access service.
As part of being able to introduce this service, Google has sought to
negotiate new terms and conditions with major record labels as well as
independent artists and labels. But many of the independent labels balked at the
terms that YouTube demanded, arguing that accepting the terms was not
plausible for them and that major record labels received
more favorable
2 37
conditions than Google offered the independent labels.
Initially, Google responded to the concerns of independent labels with a
"take-it-or-leave-it" approach, indicating that they would launch the service
simply without the music of those refusing the terms. 23 8 Furthermore, if the
independent labels did refuse to sign up to the proposed terms, they would also
be shut out from the free, ad-supported version of YouTube. 239 Subsequently,

235. Josh Constine, Google Launches "Google Play Music All Access" On-Demand
$9.99
A
Month
Subscription Service,
TECHCRUNCH
(May
15,
2013),
http: //techcrunch.com/2013 /05/15/google-play-music-all-access.
236. Steven Knopper, YouTube's new Subscription Service: Indie Labels Speak Out,
ROLLING STONE MUSIC (July 1, 2014, 1005 AM EDT), http://www.rollingstone.com/
music/news /youtubes -new -subscription- service-indie-labels -speak-out-20140701.
237. Id.
238. YouTube to Block Indie Labels Who Don't Sign Up to New Music Service, THE
GUARDIAN
(June
17,
2014,
10:03
AM
EDT),
http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2014/jun/17/youtube-indie-labels -music-subscription.
239. Id.
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amid some public uproar, Google delayed the service's launch
while seeking to
240
work out contractual issues with the remaining holdouts.
The YouTube-independent labels scenario may thus parallel the AmazonHatchette situation in important respects. In both cases the parties providing the
Technological Patronage wield significant bargaining power because their
platforms have become so dominant in their respective fields. And if the
dominant party in this case, YouTube, does ultimately shut out music from
independent labels because of their failure to accede to YouTube's terms, then
arguably the synergies between Technological Patronage and copyright
collapse as access to and production of music content is hindered rather than
facilitated.
But again, the power imbalance does not seem to be rooted in the scope of
copyright. That is, limiting the scope of fair use, or eliminating the first-sale
doctrine entirely, would not, for instance, remedy the situation. Instead, if
anything, the breakdown between Technological Patronage and copyright in
yielding access to and production of creative works stems from market
concentration. And so as a theoretical matter, the synergies between the two
remain possible so long as other bodies of law, such as antitrust, are effectively
applied.
But these types of breakdowns do support this Article's theoretical point
about copyright in general. In the technological age in which we live,
copyright, on its own, is unable to provide authors the means by which to
successfully create. Technological Patronage is increasingly necessary, and the
two are increasingly interdependent. And as is evident in situations such as
with YouTube and Amazon, when providers thereof threaten to withdraw their
support, authors, even armed with copyright, can be hard-pressed to succeed. In
such cases, antitrust may also be a necessary co-dependent in fostering a
healthy creative and innovative landscape.
C.

"Closed" Android

The history of the Android software platform also explicates some of the
themes discussed above. As mentioned previously, Android has become one of
the most popular and important software technologies in the world, powering
an array of mobile devices from a host of different parties.
Because Google provides Android under a variety of permissive, open
source software licenses, anyone can take Android free of charge and adapt it to
their own purposes. This form of Technological Patronage has thus facilitated a
significant amount of creative and innovative activity as parties have made use
of the provided technologies on a variety of devices.

240. Evan DeSimone, YouTube Gives Indie Labels a Reprieve... For Now, NMR (July
7, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://newmediarockstars.com/2014/07/youtube-gives-indie-labels-areprieve-for-now.
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But the story of Android is more complicated than that. For instance, for
those wishing to have access to Google's suite of applications such as Google
Maps, gMail, and others on their Android-powered devices, one must sign
Google's so-called "Anti-Fragmentation" Agreement ("AFA"). 24 1 Among
other things, the AFA severely limits Android users' ability to modify Android
in ways that Google does not approve. 2 42 Parties remain free to use Android
without signing the AFA-Amazon has done precisely that with its own
version of Android that powers its mobile devices -but in so doing they are 243
cut
off from a set of software programs that Android users have come to expect.
In obtaining access to the suite of applications, users are also required to
install the entire suite of software programs; no substitutes or deletions are
permitted. 244 For instance, if a party had its own search application but wanted
the rest of the Google programs, it would have to preinstall Google's search
application in spite of having its own in order to obtain access to the other
Google applications.
Google has also at times restricted access to new releases of the Android
software. 24 5 Although Google has publicly committed itself to keeping Android
"open" for anyone to use, such incidents may suggest that its commitment can
2 46
occasionally waver based on presumably commercial self-interests.
Hence, in providing Technological Patronage in the form of Android,
Google has helped create the most popular mobile software platform in the
world. But a darker side of such patronage is that this dominance has created
certain, perhaps excessive dependencies in others that Google can then exploit
to its own advantage. And it may make good commercial sense, in some cases,
to do so.
But the larger theoretical point also remains true in the case of Android.
That is, resolving this type of issue, if it does need resolution, probably lies in
the province of antitrust law. Google's Technological Patronage remains
capable of combining with copyright to produce a wide array of creative and
innovative works-as it has previously-so long as the competitive landscape
remains a healthy one. Some argue it is not so and have recently filed lawsuits
to that effect, thereby mirroring in some respects earlier suits against Microsoft
241. Jon Brodkin, Google Blocked Acer's Rival Phone to Prevent Android
"Fragmentation,"
ARSTECHNICA
(Sept.
14,
2012,
9:15
PM
MDT),
http: //arstechrica.com/ gadgets/2 2/09/google-blocked-acers-rival-phone-to-preventandroid-fragmentation.
242. Id.
243. Kevin C. Tofel, What You Need to Know About Open Android and Google's
Android
Apps,
GIGAOM
(Feb.
13,
2014,
10:29
AM
PDT),
http://gigaom.com/2014/02/13/android-open-google-licensing-apps-services.
244. Id.
245. Google Restricts Access To Android Honeycomb, INT'L Bus. TiMEws (Mar. 25,
2011,
4:58 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/google-restricts-access-android-honeycomb277271.
246. Id.
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on the basis of its bundling of its software programs. 247 Time will tell if the
courts and government ultimately agree.
D. Antitrust Law to the Rescue?

The preceding sections suggest that antitrust law, rather than copyright,
may hold the keys to resolving situations where Technological Patrons act in
ways that harm access to and production of creative and innovative works. The
basis for that argument is that the problems, if they are problems, are ones of
competition rather than rights under copyright.
But triggering antitrust action can be a high bar. For instance, in the case of
the Amazon-Hachette spat, many experts suggest that antitrust activity is
unlikely; Amazon is simply acting in its own self-interests in seeking to reap
the greatest amount of profit from the bargain. 248 In other words, the fight
between the two is a standard-issue business battle, rather than an antitrust
violation. 249 In fact, Amazon engaged in similar behavior in 2010 with25respect
0
to another major publishing house, without triggering antitrust activity.
Furthermore, U.S. antitrust law often focuses on behavior that raises prices
for consumers; in Amazon's case, its efforts are actually geared towards
lowering prices for e-Books, thereby further diminishing the likelihood of
antitrust activity against it.2 51 The same may also hold true in the YouTubeindependent labels' fight.
The European Union has in some cases been a more fertile ground in terms
of bringing successful antitrust actions in such scenarios. For instance, antitrust
activity against Microsoft for bundling of its software programs was successful
in Europe while largely failing in the U.S. 252 To that end, an association of
independent music labels recently filed an antitrust complaint with the
European Commission against YouTube based on its threats to remove the
independent labels offerings from the free version of YouTube if the labels 2do
53
not accede to YouTube's proposed terms for its subscription service.

247. Paul Thurrott, Google Seeks Dismissal of US-Based Android Antitrust Lawsuit,
WINDOWS IP PRO (July 14, 2014), http://windowsitpro.com/paul-thurrotts-wininfo/googleseeks -dismissal -us based-android-antitrust-lawsuit.
248. Diane Bartz, Amazon/Hachette Dispute Unlikely to Provoke Regulators, Experts
Say, REUTERS (May 29, 2014, 7:53 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/29/ushachette-amazon-com-antitrust -idUSKBNOE92H620140529.
249. Id.
250. Id.

251. Robert Levine, How the Government Blew Its Chance to Rein in Amazon, VANITY
FAIR (June 2, 2014, 1:44 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2014/06/amazonhachette-antitrust-backfire.
252. See generally Sue Ann Mota, Hide It or Unbundle It: A Comparison of the
Antitrust Investigations Against Microsoft in the U.S. and the E.U., 3 PIERCE L. REv. 183
(2005) (comparing the relatively lenient outcome in the U.S. to the heftier fines in the E.U.).
253. Stuart Dredge, Impala Files EC Antitrust Complaint Over YouTube Indie Label
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2 54
Independent labels have initiated similar actions in the U.S.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore precisely how antitrust law
may or may not be applied to address such scenarios, or how it may be
reformed to do so. Instead, one of the critical points to stress is that copyright's
growing interdependence with Technological Patronage in many cases does not
appear to require significant changes to copyright law, even in cases where
copyright's dependence on Technological Patronage may be excessive, as in
some of the scenarios discussed above. At times in the past, expanding
copyright in the face of technological advancement has been the response; the
DMCA, which, among other things, instituted a variety of prohibitions against
circumventing digital rights management ("DRM"), is one such example.
But with the types of Technological Patronage discussed above, addressing
potential overdependence with expanded copyright protections seems like a
solution that does not match the problem. The problems, if they exist at all,
consist of market concentration that expanded copyright rights would do little if
anything to alleviate. Such concerns are thus the proper domain of antitrust law,
even if current incarnations of antitrust law do not adequately address them.
This point, indeed, supports the general argument of this Article: copyright
is not a standalone system for facilitating creative activity, and conceiving of it
as such leads to solutions to copyright issues that may often hinder rather than
promote creativity. Instead, copyright is an important piece of a broader
creative and innovative system, which system includes not only growing
amounts of vital Technological Patronage, but antitrust law as well.

V.

OTHER LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CoPYRIGT's TECHNOLOGICAL
INTERDEPENDENCIES

This Article has, among other things, argued that creative and innovative
activities play an important role in facilitating one another. That is, creative
activities often have the effect of triggering innovative activities, and viceversa.
And yet, patent law and copyright law are typically conceived of as
independent institutions with different purposes. 255 Patent law is generally
meant to incentivize and protect inventive and innovative activity, while
Licensing,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
27,
2014,
11:59
AM
EDT),
http: //www.theguardian.com/technology /2014/jtm/27/impala- youtube-ec-complaint-indielabel -licensing.
254. Andy Gensler, Rich Bengloff on A2IM Indie Week, YouTube Licensing; Alleges
Majors' Shady Streaming Terms, BILLBOARDBIz (June 17, 2014, 3:45 PM EDT),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/indies/6121566/rich-bengloff on-a2im-indieweek-youtube-licensing-alleges-majors.
255. See Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property
Law's Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEx. L. REv. 1921, 1921-31 (2014) (laying out some of the
basic differences, both in terms of implementation and purposes, between copyright and
patent law).
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copyright law aims to encourage and safeguard creative pursuits. 2 56 While
some commentators have identified certain commonalities between the two
bodies of law in terms of how they go about achieving their separate
purposes, 257 or suggest that more such commonalities should exist, 2 5 less
typical are calls for either body of law
to explicitly take into account and seek
259
to facilitate the purposes of the other.
This Article, in contrast, suggests that both copyright and patent law would
be well-served in incorporating changes that facilitate the purposes of the other.
In other words, because of the interdependencies between technological
innovation and creative activity, the bodies of law meant to encourage each
should explicitly acknowledge those interdependencies. Indeed, doing so would
arguably unlock latent potential in spurring both creative and innovative
efforts.

256. Id.
257. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294-300 (2003) (finding many similarities as well as
differences between patent and copyright law).
258. See generally Irina Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303, 1340
(2012) (arguing that copyright law might be improved by adopting certain tenets of
trademark law when assessing copyright infringement claims). See generally, e.g.,, Asay,
supra note 69, at 431 (proposing a conditional independent invention defense to patent
infringement); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. Cm. L. REv. 719
(2009) (arguing that patent law would do well to adopt claiming elements more typical of
copyright law); Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in IntellectualProperty
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2014) (arguing, among other things, that patent law
would benefit by adopting some of copyright law's infringement analysis tenets); Maureen
A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177
(2000) (proposing a fair use exception for patent law); Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair
Use 2.0, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011) (same); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention
as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (advocating for adoption of an
independent invention defense to patent infringement, similar to what already exists under
copyright and trade secret law).
259. But see generally Michael A. Carrier, Increasing Innovation Through Copyright
Common Sense and Better Government Policy, 62 EMORY L.J. 983 (2013) (setting forth a
number of proposed reforms to copyright law that may help foster innovation); Peter DiCola,
Copyright Equality: Free Speech, Efficiency, and Regulatory Parity in Distribution,93 B.U.
L. REV. 1837 (2013) (proposing that different distribution technologies should be treated
equally under copyright law so as to avoid slowing innovation); Peter DiCola & David
Touve, Licensing in the Shadow of Copyright, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 397 (2014) (arguing
that copyright shapes, constrains, and also presents opportunities for innovation); Lee, supra
note 2 (arguing for "technological fair use"); Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative
Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1999 (2011) (arguing that an antecedent to artistic and technological innovation is
creativity, and that intellectual property law generally, therefore, should not be implemented
in ways that undermine creativity). These proposals, while advocating for measures under
copyright law that may help avoid impeding innovation, nonetheless fall short of a call for
explicitly incorporating into patent and copyright law measures meant to achieve the
purposes of the other. That is, copyright should be reformed so that one of its primary goals
is to facilitate innovation, not just avoid hampering it. And the same applies to patent law
vis- i-vis copyright law.

STANFORD TECHNOLOGY AND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:189

Others have advocated measures that, if adopted, would arguably help
achieve such purposes. For instance, Edward Lee has proposed a "technological
fair use" defense to copyright infringement that more explicitly takes into
account the technological landscape and its effects on digital content
creation. 26 Yet others have proposed expanding the experimental use defense
under patent law, which, depending on how such a proposal were implemented,
could better protect nascent creative activities
that otherwise might infringe
26 2
26 1
on.
goes
list
the
And
patents.
relevant
The point here is not to review in detail and either recommend or disavow
such proposals, nor is it to make any additional specific proposals about how
copyright should take into account the purposes of patent law, and vice-versa;
doing so is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article suggests that
exploring these and related proposals is a vital area for future research in order
to better equip both patent and copyright law to facilitate the interdependencies
between technological innovation and creative activity that this Article has
highlighted.
Doing so may seem to some to overburden the separate bodies of law.
After all, both copyright and patent law have enough to worry about, let alone
having to try to address their effects on the purposes that the other body of law
is meant to realize. But arguably many of each body of law's problems arise in
part by conceiving each of them as standalone systems sufficient in and of
themselves to achieve their stated goals. This Article's exploration of the
interdependencies between the two suggests such is not the case.
Nor is it constitutionally required. If anything, in fact, the Constitution's
Intellectual Property Clause seems to treat patent and copyright law as
interrelated. The Clause grants Congress the power to enact intellectual
property law, reading in its entirety: "To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." The Clause thus
does not indicate that "Authors" are only relevant to the progress of "Science,"
or that only Inventors are germane to the "useful Arts." Instead, one
reasonable-and, in light of this Article's arguments, appropriateinterpretation of the text is that smartly securing and limiting rights to authors
and inventors alike will have263a productive impact on the progress of both
"Science and the useful Arts."

260. Lee, supra note 2.
261. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need I? Accommodating Intellectual
ProductionOutside the IntellectualPropertyParadigm,31 CARDozo L. REv. 1437, 1469-70
(2010) (arguing that the experimental use defense to patent infringement should be
expanded).
262. See supra note 259.
263. See Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on JP: A New Reading, 57
UCLA L. Rev. 421,463 -64 (2009) (arguing for such a reading of the IP Clause).
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CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that copyright, contrary to traditional accounts of
its origins, is not an independent means by which to encourage creative
activity. Indeed, ironically, the system that copyright was meant to displacepatronage-has resurfaced in a modern-day technological incarnation as a vital
complement to copyright in spurring creative activity. That creative activity, in
turn, helps trigger additional innovative activity. And the interdependencies
between the two are only likely to grow as the world grows increasingly
technological in nature.
This account thus suggests that, rather than undermining the creative
industries, many forms of technological advancement are instead increasingly
necessary to them. Hence, copyright's default response to technological
advancement should not be preclusion, like it often has been, but instead
inclusion. That inclusion does not require an "anything goes" attitude, but it
should at least recognize the technological realities of the broader creative
system. Indeed, as a matter of copyright theory, recognizing copyright's
interdependencies will go a long way in addressing as a practical matter
proposed solutions meant to enhance its creative proclivities.
None of this is meant to suggest that copyright is irrelevant to encouraging
creative activity. It remains a vital piece of the puzzle. And, as suggested
throughout, it is crucial to helping trigger vast amounts of technological
innovation as well, which in turn expands copyright's capacities. But copyright
remains only one piece. Recognizing the value and contributions of other
pieces, and encouraging their advancement, therefore, should be a vital piece of
any effective copyright policy. Indeed, these interdependencies, as well as the
text of the Intellectual Property Clause itself, suggest that reforming both
copyright and patent law to explicitly advance the purposes of each other is
important and justified to unlocking each body of law's full potential.
Of course, not all is rosy in the relationship between Technological
Patronage and copyright. As discussed above, at times Technological Patrons
may overreach in ways that reduce access to and production of creative works.
But in such cases, another piece of the puzzle -antitrust law-seems more
appropriate than copyright to addressing issues that largely arise from market
concentration. In other words, copyright certainly has an important role to play
in the broader creative and innovative system. But overburdening it with tasks
within that system that it is ill-fitted to perform not only fails to solve the
perceived problems, but may create additional ones instead.
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